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ISIDORO

New Member
Buenos dias. pues si estoy deacuerdo contigo. estos americanos siempre van por delante.
 

matraco

Member
Hola soy nueva en esto y me gustaría saber qué pensáis de la dichosa reunión del G20 y de

A ver que nos depara este finde el G20. Espero que salgan cosas buenas para la confianza económica, ya que esto haría que se vendieran muchos yens invertidos actualmente, ya que lo que nos tiene en estos niveles a sido la fortaleza hasta ahora del dolar, pero mucho más yo creo la mayor del yen con este ya que le está costando mucho volver a superar los 100 yens por dolar, lo cual no creo que guste mucho a Japón
 

pesga08

Active Member
Buenos dias. pues si estoy deacuerdo contigo. estos americanos siempre van por delante.
yo sigo quizás con la tonta idea de que el momento en que se ha dado a conocer la crisis financiera y su coincidencia con las elecciones EEUU, no ha sido por casualidad.
Eso en cierto modo me da esperanzas, de que lo arreglen, esas manitos que no se ven, y volvamos a un yen débil
 

pesga08

Active Member
una preguntilla para los economistas, si debemos más deuda virtual, pero que si queremos cancelar, o nos ejecutan la clausulilla, o lo que sea, vemos que no es virtual, que legalmente es lo que realmente debemos, bueno busco algo de positivo al tema: ¿cómo se declaran a hacienda cómo minusvalías?
 

yamamoto

New Member
Llevo varias semanas leyendo el foro y con respecto a los foreros que están utilizando una cuenta en yenes para pagar sus cuotas me ha surgido una duda:
¿esas cuotas se desgravan ante hacienda?
¿a que precio de contravalor en euro se te aplica si has comprados varias remesas a precios muy distintos?
Gracias de antemano.
 

borpa

Member
El banco te manda mensualmente un extracto donde te especifica el día de cobro (a como está el yen) y su contravalor en €, independientemente del precio a como se compraron las divisas.
Por lo menos así lo hace Bk
 

yamamoto

New Member
El banco te manda mensualmente un extracto donde te especifica el día de cobro (a como está el yen) y su contravalor en €, independientemente del precio a como se compraron las divisas.
Por lo menos así lo hace Bk
gracias por la respuesta. Buen finde
 

ffrhmd

Member
Los japoneses quieren tomar el mando... para solucionar la Crisis

Japan Takes On Leadership Role In Global Crisis.

Japan, traditionally passive, might use its deep pockets and bitter experience from the 1990s to help global growth and, along the way, Japan’s own export-driven economy.
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director of the IMF, welcomed Prime Minister Aso's announcement in Nov-08 that Japan is prepared to lend up to US$100 bn to the IMF.
While government officials said Japan would not participate in bilateral interventions, the Finance Minister said in October that the country was ready to offer some of its foreign reserves to the IMF to support aid packages where needed around the world (FT); there is concern that the IMF does not have sufficient resources to support emerging economies worst affected by global financial crisis.
Japan's $996 billion of foreign reserves are second only to the $1.8 trillion held by China.
If Asian governments are to contribute additional funds, they will expect in return to receive a greater voice on the decision-making boards of the IMF and other institutions.
G20 summit of world leaders on Nov 15 could provide an opportunity for Asian leaders to stake their claim to a greater role in the world's financial architecture, taking account of a shift in the balance of global economic power from West to East
Noland: Asia has the financial wherewithal to go its own way and establish an alternative rescue mechanism to the IMF. Whether it will do so depends significantly on the capacity of Japan and China to act cooperatively and how far the responses of the U.S. and Europe go in addressing the longstanding demands of the Asians (and others) for a more inclusive policymaking international-financial architecture.
 

Jesus AT

Well-Known Member
Ya te digo, tengo curiosidad por saber cual sera su contraanalisis... :D Lo tenia en estima al llinares este pero lo voy a tener que arrestar un tiempo.

Saludos...


[/I][/COLOR]

Se ha estrenado bien con su análisis...[/QUOTE]

Después de mirar técnicamente los mercados encuentro justificacion al rebote, lastima que los usa no acompañen. El rebote podría ser mayor.


Si ,son solo rebotes de ajuste de mercado.

Paulson no hace eco de la misma, y piensa que la segunda parte del plan de ayuda financiera (de 700 mil dólares) debe volcarse para aliviar las presiones de los consumidores norteamericanos - y no para respaldar títulos hipotecarios en default-.



Esta situación ha llevado a quienes practican el carry trade a comprar yenes para devolver los préstamos obtenidos a bajo coste en ésta divisa. Por este motivo está nuevamente cayendo el cruce del €/y

Yo espero el leñazo seguro 1º trimestre 2009, 90-100 y si no al tiempo
 

ffrhmd

Member
Perspectivas... economicas en Europa, Usa y Japón

En este documento de la OCDE se comentan.

Lo más interesante,

1. The OECD area economy appears to have entered recession, and unemployment is now rising in many OECD countries. OECD projections point to a protracted downturn, with GDP likely to decline by a 1/3 of a percent in 2009, but the uncertainties are large. That goes not least for the depth and duration of the financial crisis, the prime driver of the downturn. In this regard, underlying the projections is an assumption that the extreme financial stress since mid-September is short-lived, but will be followed by an extended period of financial headwinds through late 2009, with a gradual normalization thereafter. Another important driver of the projection is the ongoing adjustment in housing markets, which in many European economies, based on past housing cycles, still has a long way to go. Partially offsetting these contractionary forces is the boost to real household incomes due to sharply lower commodity prices.

2. Earlier concerns about inflation exceeding comfort levels have dissipated in recent months. Inflation peaked this summer in many OECD countries, and is now declining. If, as assumed, commodity prices are sustained at their recent lower levels and as increasing economic slack exerts downward pressure on prices, inflation should continue to moderate.

3. The distribution of risks around the projection is wide. In 2009, these risks are skewed on the downside. They include, among others, a longer period than assumed before financial conditions normalise, further failures of financial institutions and emerging market economies being hit harder by the downturn in global trade and a reassessment of risk by foreign investors. There are upside risks too. Adjustment in bank balance sheets may advance more quickly in response to the substantial and comprehensive policy measures introduced. Policy stimulus over and above that factored into the projections cannot be excluded either. For 2010, widespread risks remain, but these are more equally distributed, reflecting the possibility of an economic recovery starting earlier.

4. Against the backdrop of a deep economic downturn, additional macroeconomic stimulus is needed. In normal times, monetary, rather than fiscal policy would be the stabilisation instrument of choice, and further monetary easing has been built in. But in the current conditions of extreme financial stress, the monetary transmission mechanism may have weakened. Moreover, in the United States and Japan the scope for further reductions in policy rates is limited. In this unusual situation, fiscal policy too has a role to play. Automatic stabilizers should be allowed to operate in full, and in those countries where room for budgetary manoeuvre exists, discretionary fiscal easing remains an important near-term policy option. However, it is vital that any discretionary action be timely and temporary and designed so as to ensure maximum effectiveness. Tax cuts aimed at credit-constrained households, for instance, might prove effective. At the same time, with high public debt in many OECD economies, it will be equally important that a credible framework is in place to ensure fiscal sustainability over the long run.

5. The need for further measures to stabilize financial markets cannot be excluded. In this event, international co-operation is desirable to avoid measures that distort competition or which effectively shift the problem to other countries. It is equally important that measures are designed and implemented in ways that allow their orderly removal as conditions in financial markets normalise. Apart from dealing with current financial market distress, it will also be necessary to re-examine the features of the regulatory and supervisory framework that created incentives for excessive risk-taking and led financial institutions to increase leverage in non-transparent ways to levels that proved to be unsustainable. When addressing these issues, it will be important to focus on reforms to the global financial architecture and at the same time resist pressures for a wider rollback of open markets which would prove costly.
 

ffrhmd

Member
Roubini avisa... USA depende de China

Curioso: La economia capitalista USA depende de China . El año 2009 será duro.

For the last few years the global economy has been running on two engines, the U.S. on the consumption side and China on the production side, both lifting the entire global economy. The U.S. has been the consumer of first and last resort spending more than its income and running large current account deficits while China (and other emerging market economies) has been the producer of first and last resort, spending less than its income and running ever larger current account surpluses.

For the last few months the first engine of global growth has effectively shut down as the latest batch of macro news from the U.S. are worse than awful: collapsing consumption and consumer confidence, plunging housing, collapsing auto sales, plunging durable goods spending (while supply side indicators such as production, ISM and employment are also free falling). The U.S. is entering its worst consumer recession in decades both supply and demand data look worse than in the severe recessions of 1974-75 and 1980-82. And in due time this tsunami of awful macro news, together with ugly downside surprises to earnings will take another toll on equity valuations that are now temporarily lifted by another bear market sucker’s rally.

More worrisome there are now increasing signs that the other main engine of the global economy – China - is also stalling. Let us consider now in detail the evidence that China may be on its way to a hard landing…


The latest batch of macro data from China are mixed but all pointing towards a sharp deceleration of economic growth: official GDP data showing growth down to 9% from the 12% of a couple of years ago; sharply falling spending on consumer durables (autos); falling home sales and sharp fall in construction activity; leading indicators of the manufacturing sector (the Chinese PMI) showing a value of 44.6% (i.e. an outright contraction of manufacturing as a level below 50% indicates a contraction), its lowest level ever since its publication. 9 out of 11 PMI sub indices showed contraction - Output, New Orders, Input Prices, Purchases of Inputs, New Export Orders, Imports, Backlogs of Orders, Stocks of Major Inputs. Output index fell to 44.3 from 54.6 in September, while new orders dropped to 41.7 from 51.3, while the inventory index climbed to 51.4 from 50.5. The decline in total orders has been even stronger than in export orders, thus suggesting a weakening in both domestic and export demand. And the decline in construction activity is without doubt a major contributor to the recent weakness in industrial activity in China.

Note also that manufacturing, which accounts for 40% of China's GDP, is slowing based on surveys of manufacturers, matching with anecdotal reports of factory closures in China's south East coast. Industrial production has slowed to the lowest level in 6-years (output rose 11.4% in September, from 12.8% in August). While slowdown may have been exacerbated by the Olympics shut-down, it has been on a slowing trend for months. The Federation of Hong Kong Industries predicts that 10% of an estimated 60 to 70 thousands Hong Kong-run factories in the Pearl River Delta will close this year. And of course the Chinese equity bubble (P/E ratios reached a ridiculous level of 60 plus late last year) has now gone bust big time with the Shanghai index now having fallen over 60% from its bubbly peak.

There is thus now a growing risk of a hard landing in China. Let us be clear what we mean by hard landing. In a country with the potential growth of China hard landing would occur if the growth rate of the economy were to slow down to 5-6% as China needs a growth rate of 9-10% to absorb about 24 million folks joining the labor force every year; it needs a growth rate of 9-10% to move every year about 12-14 million poor rural farmers to the modern industrial/manufacturing urban sector. The whole social and political legitimacy of the regime of the ruling Communist party rests on continuing to deliver this high growth great transformation of the economy. Thus, a slowdown of growth from 12% to 5-6% would be the equivalent of a hard landing or a recession for China. And now a variety of macro indicators suggest that China is indeed headed towards a hard landing.

Note that China is an economy is structurally dependent on exports: net exports (or the trade balance surplus) are close to 12% of GDP (up from 2% earlier in the decade) and exports represent about 40% of GDP. Real investment in China is about 45% of GDP and, leaving aside the part of this investment that is housing and infrastructure spending, about half of this capex spending goes towards the production of new capital goods that produces more exportable goods. So, with the sum of exports and investment representing about 80% of GDP, most of Chinese aggregate demand depends on its ability to sustain an export based economic growth.

The trouble –however – is that the main outlet of Chinese exports – the U.S. consumer – is now collapsing for the first time in two decades. Chinese exports to the U.S. were growing at an annualized rate of over 20% a year ago; while the most recent bilateral trade data from the U.S. now show that this export growth has now fallen down to 0%. But the worst is still to come in the next few quarters: after an ok second quarter in the U.S. (boosted by the tax rebates) U.S. retailers hoped that the consumer downturn would be minor: they thus placed over the summer massive orders for Chinese (and other imported) goods for Q3 and Q4. But now the U.S. holiday season clearly looks like the worst that the U.S. will experience in decades and the result of it will be a huge overhang of unsold Chinese good. Thus, you can expect that orders of Chinese goods for Q1 of 2009 and the rest of 2009 will be sharply down dragging Chinese exports to the U.S. into sharply negative territory. And it is not just Chinese exports to the U.S.: until a few months ago the U.S. was starting to contract but the rest of the advanced economies (Europe, Canada, Japan and Australia/New Zealand) were growing at a sustained rate, thus boosting Chinese exports. But there is now strong evidence that a severe recession has now started in almost all of the advanced economies. You can thus expect that Chinese export growth to Europe, Canada, Japan, etc. will sharply decelerate in the next few quarters, thus adding to the fall in Chinese net exports. And once Chinese export growth sharply decelerates and net exports sharply fall you can expect a severe fall in capex spending in China as there is already a large excess capacity of exportable goods given the massive overinvestment of the last few years. Thus, a sharp fall in net exports and a sharp fall in real investment will likely trigger a hard landing in China. Considering the certainty of a recession in advanced economies and the high likelihood of a global recession there is now a very high probability that Chinese growth could slow down to 7% or even lower in 2009 (7% growth for China is indeed now the forecast of a leading bank such as Standard Chartered); and 7% is just a notch above the 6% that would represent a near hard landing for China.

Can aggressive monetary/credit and fiscal policy easing prevent this hard landing? Not necessarily. First note that China has already reduced interest rates three times in the last few months and easing some credit controls. But monetary and credit policy easing may be ineffective: if capex spending by the corporate sector will start to fall sharply as the fall in next exports leads to a sharp fall in the expected return on new capital spending on exportables a reduction of interest rates and/or an easing of credit controls will make little difference to such capex spending: easing money and credit will be like pushing on a string as the overinvestment of the last few years has led to a glut of capital goods. There is indeed already evidence that but corporate loan demands have diminished sharply while commercial banks have hesitated to lend while choosing to firewall risks. The government can ease money and credit but it cannot force corporate to spend and banks to lend if loan demand is falling because of low expected returns on investment.

..... sigue......
 

ffrhmd

Member
USA vs China

... continua ...

Could fiscal policy rescue the day and prevent a Chinese hard landing? The optimists argue yes by pointing out that fiscal deficits and public debt are low in China and that China has the resources to engineer a rapid fiscal stimulus in a short period of time. But the ability of China to implement a rapid and massive fiscal stimulus is limited for a variety of reasons.

First, as pointed out by recent research (Global Insight) the combined effects of natural disasters, social strife in the West, and the Olympics have created a large hole in the central government budget this fiscal year. The Ministry of Finance may have dipped into various stabilisation funds to avoid the appearance of running a large deficit. For regional and municipal governments, the decline in turnover in local property markets has reduced the flow of fees and taxes, causing them to delay ambitious industrial development plans in some cases.

Second, a hard landing in the economy and in investment would lead to a sharp increase in non-performing loans of the – still mostly public – state banks; the implicit liabilities from a serious banking problem would then add to the implicit and explicit budget deficits and public debt. Note that the poor quality of the underwriting by Chinese banks –that financed a huge overinvestment in the economy - has been hidden for the last few years by the high growth of the economy. Once net exports go bust and real investment sharply falls we will see a massive surge in non-performing loans that financed low return and marginal investment projects. The ensuing fiscal costs of cleaning up the banking system could be really high.

Third, as pointed out by Michael Pettis – a leading expert of the Chinese economy – a surge in tax revenues in last 4 years has been more than matched by surge in spending so that if revenue growth diminishes/reverses it might not be easy to slow spending growth proportionately. Contingent liabilities from non-performing loans could also reduce resources available for a fiscal stimulus. As argued by Pettis: Total direct and indirect debt (and I am not including long term obligations like unfunded pension liabilities) is probably much higher than the official numbers which, depending on how you count, range from 15% to 30% of GDP…However, for reasons I have discussed many times before on this blog, I think actual Chinese government debt exceeds the visible debt. My guess is that without counting the possibility of rising NPLs in case of an economic slowdown (which ultimately can become contingent liabilities of the government), total government debt in China is probably 50% of GDP or higher. That means that China has a lot less room for running large fiscal deficits than we might suppose, and during the time it most needs to run a deficit – when the economy is slowing sharply – we may anyway see a surge in contingent debt as bank NPLs surge.

Fourth, while a fiscal policy stimulus has already started its scope and size has been so far relatively modest. Major stimulus measures announced by the Chinese government have included a major export tax rebate hike and a new state infrastructure plan and agreement to increase grain purchases to prop up export and investment growth. Further spending may include tax reform (value added tax to support fixed investment), more infrastructure spending, and on social security as well as government activities to provide capital to small and medium sized enterprises which can't access credit yet. The big question is however whether the Chinese government could increase the fiscal stimulus by an order of magnitude larger than the current effort if a quick order hard landing were to occur. The answer is probably not as moving a massive amount of economic resources from the tradeable sector to the non-tradeable sector (infrastructures and government spending on goods and services) will take time and cannot be done in a short period of time: the Chinese government has massive infrastructure projects for the next 5-10 years; but front-loading most of that multi-year spending over the next 12 to 18 months (if a hard landing risks to occur) will be close to mission impossible.

In conclusion the risk of a hard landing in China is sharply rising; a deceleration in the Chinese growth rate to 7% in 2009 - just a notch above a 6% hard landing – is highly likely and an even worse outcome cannot be ruled out at this point. The global economy is already headed towards a global recession as advanced economies are all in a recession and the U.S. contraction is now dramatically accelerating. The first engine of global growth – the U.S. on the consumption side – has now already shut down. The second engine of global growth – China on the production side – is also on its way to stalling. Thus, with the two main engines of global growth now in serious trouble a global hard landing is now almost a certainty. And a hard landing in China will have severe effects on growth in emerging market economies in Asia, Africa and Latin America as Chinese demand for raw materials and intermediate inputs has been a major source of economic growth for emerging markets and commodity exporters. The sharp recent fall in commodity prices and the near collapse of the Baltic Freight index are clear signals that Chinese and global demand for commodities and industrial inputs is sharply falling. Thus, global growth – at market prices – will be close to zero in Q3 of 2008, likely negative in Q4 of 2009 and well into negative territory in 2009. So brace yourself for an ugly and protracted global economic contraction in 2009.
 

Krupier

Well-Known Member
El banco te manda mensualmente un extracto donde te especifica el día de cobro (a como está el yen) y su contravalor en €, independientemente del precio a como se compraron las divisas.
Por lo menos así lo hace Bk
A mí en Caixa Catalunya me manda el extracto sólo en yenes, no con su contravalor en euros, pero según me dijo el director de mi oficina, para hacer la declaración sí envían el extracto con todo lo que has pagado en euros durante el año.......eso espero!!!

A ver si algún veterano lo aclara...
 

matraco

Member
A mí en Caixa Catalunya me manda el extracto sólo en yenes, no con su contravalor en euros, pero según me dijo el director de mi oficina, para hacer la declaración sí envían el extracto con todo lo que has pagado en euros durante el año.......eso espero!!!

A ver si algún veterano lo aclara...

Puedes tener cuenta en yenes en caixa catalunya ?
Si es a si ,cual es el mecanismo para comprar yenes iternet ,telefono me interesaria mucho saberlo yo tambien estoy en este banco .
De todas maneras haber si me paso a ver al director de mi sucursal.
 

Krupier

Well-Known Member
Puedes tener cuenta en yenes en caixa catalunya ?
Si es a si ,cual es el mecanismo para comprar yenes iternet ,telefono me interesaria mucho saberlo yo tambien estoy en este banco .
De todas maneras haber si me paso a ver al director de mi sucursal.
Tengo abierta una cuenta multidivisas y ahí van los yenes que compro por teléfono llamando a mi oficina o bien voy directamente a la oficina a pedir que me los compren. Por más yenes que compre, sólo me cobran de comisión 5 euros, que es su mínimo.

Por internet de momento no se pueden comprar.

A esta cuenta va asociado el cobro de las cuotas y, de lo único que me he de preocupar es de tener suficientes yenes para satisfacer cada cuota que me vence......Así de sencillo.

Entré en Junio y menos mal que compre el mismo día de entrada yenes para un año entero, es decir, a un valor de 161.

De momento estoy pagando con esta primera compra y a ver si de aquí a Junio se deprecia el yen y de nuevo puedo comprar a un buen valor.

Por cierto.......mi entrada triunfal a 165, así que imagina.....de momento mi contravalor en euros se ha incrementado en 78.000 lereles:eek:

Ánimo a todos los yeneros.:cool:
 

ffrhmd

Member
No mistakes....

que "jo..." el Obama...

Fuente.- Bloomberg.

Obama Urges Congress to Make `Down Payment' on Economic Rescue

Nov. 15 (Bloomberg) -- President-elect Barack Obama urged Congress to extend unemployment benefits as part of a ``down payment'' on a U.S. economic rescue plan as world leaders meet in Washington today to fight the global recession.

Extended assistance ``for the more than 1 million Americans who will have exhausted their unemployment insurance by the end of this year'' is an immediate priority, Obama said in the Democratic Party's weekly radio address.

Economic figures released in the past week show the number of people collecting unemployment benefits is the highest since 1983, and that retail sales plunged in October by the most in almost two decades. Consumer spending accounts for about two- thirds of the economy.

Congress, which is reconvening in the week ahead, should also ``pass at least a down payment on a rescue plan that will create jobs, relieve the squeeze on families, and help get the economy growing again,'' Obama said. ``If Congress does not pass an immediate plan that gives the economy the boost it needs, I will make it my first order of business as president.''

Democratic leaders have been pushing for months for a second economic stimulus package of at least $100 billion, amid signs the $168 billion stimulus package in February hasn't stopped the nation from sinking into a recession. President George W. Bush and congressional Republicans have resisted further aid.

Obama said he welcomed Bush's decision to convene to the Group of 20 economic summit ``because our global economic crisis requires a coordinated global response.''

``Make no mistake: this is the greatest economic challenge of our times,'' Obama said.

Albright, Leach

The president-elect, who is organizing his administration, isn't attending the G-20 meeting, sending former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former Republican Representative Jim Leach to meet delegations instead.

``As we act in concert with other nations, we must also act immediately here at home to address America's own economic crisis,'' Obama said today. ``If this financial crisis has taught us anything, it's that we cannot have a thriving Wall Street while Main Street suffers -- in this country, we rise or fall as one nation; as one people.''

For the longer term, Obama today said he would push for increased spending on infrastructure, renewable energy, health care and education in the U.S.

In the House of Representatives, New York's Charles Rangel -- chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, which oversees tax policy -- said he's revising a proposal to reduce corporate tax rates to 28 percent from the current rate of 35 percent to accommodate Obama's agenda. Rangel made his comments on Bloomberg Television's ``Money and Politics'' program.

Aid for Automakers

The Senate, meantime, may take up a $25 billion bailout for automakers as early as Monday during a post-election lame-duck session in which Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid also will seek to provide more unemployment benefits.

In a separate development, Obama's office announced today that he will ``will continue to record and make available the Democratic radio addresses on video when he is in the White House.'' Previous presidents used only radio to distribute the weekly speech.
 

POKEMON

Member
a fffrrrmd , perdona si me equivoco pero es que tu nick es dificilillo corazón

:confused::confused::confused:Aunque mi querido darkpollo me contestó que mi hoja de cálculo va mal (¡ojalá!) he descargado la de Rul y a mí mis cálculos me dan lo mismo que a él si no exactamente parecidosyo me pregunto lo siguiente: si mi hoja de cálculo no va mal actualmente debo 314.412 € a 128 entrada y 1.60 libor. Si el mes que viene se pone aprox en lo que se estima (-10% a 115,43) yo ya voy debiendo 347.836,84 además del aumento de la cuota; llegada la 6ª cuota ya debería 526.768,64 y estaría pagando una cuota más alta que en euros* y debería 178.931 € más (siempre con la esperanza de que no baje más de un 10%). Mi hoja va bien o mal?Perdón que pregunte....pero, qué alternativa tienen los que entraron a 160? No es mejor salirse corrrrrrriendo de aquí.Lo siento, ya sé que son 30 años, también sé que tuve una buena entrada a 128 (pero el momento desde luego el más inapropiado).[/QUOTE]
 

Patxi

Member
Pokemon tu siempre deberás los 347.866 si sigue a 115, y tu creo que tambien tendras muchas posibilidades de salir corriendo.:D:D
 
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