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RafaYen

Active Member
Día de Venus. (viernes en Romano antiguo) (4)

4 – Sobre los profetas.




Bajo mi humilde punto de vista aquí no va a salir NADIE ni de la UE ni del Euro. A mi me parece que en la historia de la UE, cuando se da un paso, se da en firme. En ningún momento anterior he visto ningún retroceso en la formación de la Unión. Ni en tiempos de bonanza ni en tiempos de crisis. A mi más bien me parece que la UE va en 5ª velocidad por una autopista donde no hay marcha atrás. Mira,…. se han olvidado de ponérsela

¿Alguien se ha puesto a pensar en el coste que tendría la hipotética salida del Euro de algún miembro? Y no solo para el país saliente, sino para el resto de países integrantes de la UE.

En primer lugar, para el país saliente implicaría la creación de instituciones y estructuras financieras a nivel nacional que en su momento, con la incorporación a la moneda única, fueron abolidas. La primera de todas ellas sería el Banco Central del país en cuestión. Así como toda la infraestructura e instituciones que permiten el control monetario a los países.

Costes de acuñación de la nueva –o antigua- moneda. Costes de recogida del Euro y de distribución de la nueva –o antigua- moneda. Costes de adaptación de los sistemas contables de las empresas. Costes de adaptación de los sistemas informáticos. Costes de adaptación de monederos de toda la maquinaria automática. Costes de sustitución de precios. Costes de… creo que no hace falta que siga. Ya lo hemos vivido una vez y sabemos las implicaciones prácticas que supone un cambio de moneda. Y no solo hablamos de costes económicos. Sino coste en tiempos. La implantación del Euro ha sido un proceso de años. ¿Por qué razón alguien puede pensar ahora que una marcha atrás es cuestión de 3 días?

Todo esto sin hablar del daño que podría sufrir el Euro ante una hipotética salida del Euro de algún país. Es más que seguro que esto sería interpretado por el mercado como el principio del derrumbamiento del Euro. La caída sería estrepitosa. Posiblemente si algún país saliera, sería el fin del Euro como moneda. Y eso, con todo lo que llevamos invertido en este proyecto, no puede pasar.

Y creo que nadie con un mínimo de sentido común y con unos mínimos conocimientos de historia puede ver este escenario ni como una remota posibilidad; sino más bien todo lo contrario.

Estas historias de salida del Euro de nosecuales países, de una “profecía” de una gran crisis y la vuelta a la “neo-peseta” y otros cuentos chinos varios ya hace tiempo que circulan no solo por los foros, sino en algún que otro “pretendido” medio de información.

Personalmente, y es posible que esté en un error, veo al Euro como la moneda del futuro. Creo que el control de la inflación y la NO emisión de papel moneda de forma irresponsable es la clave para preservar el valor de la divisa. Y está claro que el BCE eso lo tiene muy presente.

Los USA pueden seguir jugando a ser “Masters del Universo” todo lo que quieran. Pueden seguir dando y quitando “A”, “AA”, “AA+” y triples “As” a las instituciones financieras Europeas. Pero los que están aplicando políticas Keynesianas a la economía son ellos. Que se siga endeudando el estado y que impriman billetitos para auto-financiarse, que dentro de unos años,… veremos como queda su divisa.

La ideología de las nuevas generaciones de economistas Europeos tiene muy presentes los postulados de Milton Friedman y la denominada escuela de Chicago. Aquí sabemos muy bien qué sucede cuando un estado endeudado imprime dinero sin límite, especialmente Alemania. Y nuestra divisa en el futuro también será el reflejo de las decisiones que los estados tomen en estos tiempos difíciles de crisis.

Llegados a este punto, me gustaría plantearos 2 preguntas:

La primera: ¿Alguien cree todavía que esto de la UE es un juego donde hoy participo y mañana no?

La segunda: ¿Alguien duda de que la moneda del futuro se llama Euro?

Mi opinión sobre los profetas ya la conocéis. No voy a decir nada más al respecto. Creo que alguna vez ya he dicho que: “soy dueño de mis silencios,… y esclavo de mis palabras”.

Por lo tanto, no me queda más que pediros lo que siempre os pido: que penséis por vosotros mismos en base a la información que tenéis a vuestro alcance. Que “paséis” de profetas y adivinos que lo único que buscan es notoriedad a cualquier precio. Si es preciso, diciendo el disparate más grande que para ello se les ocurra.

Que no os vendan la moto. Que de ésta salimos. Y además airosos. Sino,… al tiempo.

Ánimos, que multidiviseros unidos jamás serán vencidos.

P.D. Seguimiento del Yen: pues el Yen a su p*t* bola. Como de costumbre. Escalando la directriz alcista poco a poco, porque hay que ir asegurando posiciones,… ¿no?


Saludos.



Entrada = 95.000.000 M de JPY el 15-11-2007.

Salida prevista a Euros:
2014 si EUR/JPY >170 and EURIBOR-LIBOR_YEN<1.5 sino en el 2020.

Nadie debería tomar sus decisiones financiera basadas en opiniones leidas en foros.
Cada uno es responsable de sus actos
.
 

Badraul

Member
Pero rafa!! por dios!! el tema 2 lo tienes en la cabeza o has tirado de emeroteca (ahora conocido como "google it!")? Por un momento no sabia si estaba leyendote o repasando mis apuntes para opositar!!

saludos
 

RafaYen

Active Member
Jejeje.

Buenas Raul.

Pero rafa!! por dios!! el tema 2 lo tienes en la cabeza o has tirado de emeroteca (ahora conocido como "google it!")? Por un momento no sabia si estaba leyendote o repasando mis apuntes para opositar!!

saludos

Jejeje. Obviamente he tirado de hemeroteca. No soy partidario de mal gastar las pocas neuronas que tengo usandolas para almacenar fechas, ni datos que se pueden encontrar fácilmente escritos en otros sitios.

Saludos.
 

trapaga

Well-Known Member
pues nada rafayen, cada uno con sus gustos y por tus esfuerzos te obsequiamos con....


para cuando salgas del curro ( como hoy es viernes, podemos pasarnos un poquito ¿no?.....)​

como las bebidas deben ser acompañadas con argo pa picar....​


al cabo de un ratito, empezaran a juntarse en el estomago y en la....​


pero el sabado y domingo volvera la cruda realidad....​








saludos​
 

fx-deline

Member
Los malos datos del IPC de Tokio no han sido impedimento en el comportamiento de la moneda nipona. A pesar de que el greenback se está apreciando frente al yen, la paridad se mantiene por debajo del techo en 96.00 yenes por dólar. Actualmente, el par se negocia a 95.90, en zona neutral.
Alertas de Forex del día de hoy
 

RafaYen

Active Member



Muchas gracias Trapaga. Con todo este "material" .....

no solo veré esto .....

sino que hasta seré capaz de ver el EUR/JPY=253,25 Eso si. El 24 de Marzo del 2017 a las 12.42 PM GTM +1. Y será viernes


Saludos.
 
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trapaga

Well-Known Member
mira que me "hesforsao" a tope y me quedao...


pero para esa fecha, esa hora y ese minuto, solo llego a verlo a 253,23 :p

bueno, vuelvo a lo "questaba asiendo"

saludos​
 

pepo

Well-Known Member
EUR/JPY=253,25 Eso si. El 24 de Marzo del 2017 a las 12.42 PM GTM +1. Y será viernes
Me voy a apuntar esta fecha en el calendario indio para preparar el cambio a euros. Y espérate que no compre todas las navidades un décimo del 025325, Gracias, Rafayen. ;)
 

SerraAngel

New Member
Hola a todos,

Rafa, como en otras ocasiones, muy buenos tus posts. Solo quería exponer mis pensamientos respecto a que el € será la moneda del futuro. Evidentemente por el hecho de vivir donde vivo y tener una hipoteca en Yenes desearía que así fuera.

Sin embargo el hecho de que dolar tenga la hegemonía a nivel mundial no depende solo de los USA, también depende de Japón, China y otros paises emergentes, pero sobre todo de China. Esto es debido a que gran parte de la deuda emitida por los USA ha sido comprada últimamente por China (al igual que en los años 90 la compró Japón). Es más si ha China le diese por vender toda la deuda USA que tiene se colapsaría el sistema financiero internacional. Ahogaría literalmente el mercado de con dólares.

El caso es que no les interesa que el dolar sea una moneda débil. Es lógico ¿no? Si tu compras una divisa lo que te interesa es que esa divisa valga lo más posible frente a otras divias para que en el caso de que la vendas saques beneficios.

El tema está en que ya está habiendo rumures de que paises como Brasil, Rusia, India y China (sumad el número de habitantes=potenciales consumidores :eek:) que abogan porque se cree una nueva "divisa" para las transacciones internacionales. Pienso que le están viendo las orejas al lobo como bien decías Rafa, y no quieren que todos los dolares que actualmente tienen no valgan nada.

Obviamente esto no creo que se cree de la noche a la mañana pero puede ser más rápido que implementar una divisa "real" en un pais (ya que esta no habría que acuñarla, sería "virtual").

En fin, creo que es algo que no nos tendría que preocupar en un perido de tiempo corto pero que lo tendríamos que tener en cuenta como input a la hora de tomar alguna decisión del tipo entro/salgo de tal divisa (la hipoteca se sobreentiende).

Perdonad por el ladrillo y por la p*j*ela mental que me acabo de hacer un viernes por la tarde.

Saludos a todos los foreros.
 
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gorgijasp

Member
¿fuera del euro?

Buenas tardes a [email protected] Como dice Rafa no es la primera vez que se leen cosas como que "españa se sale del euro" o Inglaterra entra en la eurozona. Pues no lo uno ni lo otro. Dos de las muchas razones que se puede argumentar:
a) Sobre la salida de España del euro...¿sabeis cuanto se pagaría nada mas en amortizar la deuda, con pago de intereses claro, en una moneda distinta del euro? A lo "mojó" no se encuentran ceritos en la calculadora....bueno esto es exagerado ¿eh?.
b) Entrada de England en urozona.....¿de verdad un pais euroesceptico como este va a ceder soberania de tipo economico a las instituciones economicas de la eurozona?. Ni pensarlo.

Un saludo y buen finde
 

Badraul

Member
b) Entrada de England en urozona.....¿de verdad un pais euroesceptico como este va a ceder soberania de tipo economico a las instituciones economicas de la eurozona?. Ni pensarlo.
Pues seria un detalle que lo hicieran, y no solo por los que viajamos, sino por la ayudita a la famosa "cesta" de intercambio de divisas... vamos, por el empujoncito que le daria al Euro sobre el resto.

Rafa, esta semana no pedias ayuda para el tema del viernes proximo, pero yo asi, como el que no quiere la cosa, te dejo caer algo sobre la entrada o no del "paund" en el euro. no de si nos conviene o no, o si les conviene a ellos o no; mas bien, de si pasará o no.

saludos y buen finde.

P.D. que si no es el proximo y es otro, tampoco pasa nada eh! la birra la tienes pagada igualmente.
 

daviz

Member
Hola a todos:
Pues bueno yo también veo improbable que se puedan realizar maniobras como salirse del Euro, cuando la tendencia a medio plazo es que los `paises recién entrados en la UE puedan converger al Euro. Finalmente facilita a muchos las transacciones entre paises que tiene una gran nivel de comercio, no hay que olvidar que la unión política es lo que en el fondo fue una escusa para la unión monetaria y la desaparición de frontereas y aranceles para el comercio dentro de Europa (acordaos del Benelux).
Respecto a la creacción de una nueva moneda para las transaciones internacionales ...es verdad se ha creado una nueva: El Euro, y en cierto modo puede competir a medio plazo en las transacciones internacionales. Pero hoy por hoy los principales mercados del mundo, especilamente de materias primas se hacen en dolares ; al igual que muchísimas transacciones.
Y por otro lado finalmente no hemos visto grandes cambios en el sistema financiero internacional, no ha habido otro Breton woods, no se ha reiventado el capitalismo; incluso algunos de los grandes directivos de banca que favorecieron este crack del 2008, han vuelto a puesto de responsabilidad. Por lo que desde mi modesto entender hemos visto otra crisis cíclica del sistema económico, de la que se aprovecharan los mas fuertes (como siempre) que podrán comerse mas trozo del mercado internacional y aprovechar para mejorar su posición en el mercado y solucionar problemas de "competitividad" como los grandes costes de producción en el "Primer Mundo"mediante la reducción de derechos a los trabajadores.
Poco mas veremos de todo esto, el dinero que escondieron debajo de las piedras los inversores irá poco a poco fluyendo , con algunas reglas de juego nuevas: mas control y seguridad para los inversores, y dentro de poco otra vez las ganacias y la especulación.
En fin perdón por la pedrada.
Un saludo:
Daviz
 

ffrhmd

Member
Niall Ferguson

..interesante entrevista... Gracias Niall.

Q: You’ve used the phrase “the great repression” to describe the state of mind of the world’s leaders. What do you mean by that?
The Great Repression is of course is a play on words.

Repression is a psychological term. We often talk about being in denial about a trauma. I think there are a great many people who are still in denial about the scale of this economic crisis. The Obama administration, for example, published a budget document not so very long ago which projects US economy will grow 3% next year 4% the year after that and 4.6% the year after that. That’s a fairy story. Anybody who bases their budget plans on a forecast like that is exhibiting all the symptoms of the great repression.

The denial is actually quite widespread. Even people who think that they are being realistic, still assume that by next year we’ll be back to normal and the economy will grow again. I think that’s because of the expectation that the future will be very like the recent past, when recessions don’t last more than a year and a half. Therefore it is inconceivable to them that this thing could be as protracted as a depression. I think this is a depression. It’s not as serious a depression as ’29 to ‘33 period, but certainly it will be as protracted as that.


Q: What numbers would you cite to explain why this economic setback is worse than the recessions we’ve seen in our lifetimes?
I would begin with debt burden under which US financial institutions and households and European financial institutions and households and western governments are laboring. In the US if you add all the private and public debt together you get something like 355% of GDP. That’s a pretty big number historically. This is an economic crisis of excessive debt, or of leverage as we like to say these days. It’s quite different from the recessions that happened in the ‘70s and ‘80s, which were recessions caused in large measure my monetary tightening at a time of inflationary pressure. This thing is happening at a time when monetary policy has essentially been set to zero in terms of interest rates and in which fed has injected massive amount of stimulus into the monetary base.

The contraction of output and the increase in unemployment that has happened in the US is reminiscent of the early 80s and early 70s but the difference is that this isn’t going to stop the way it did then. Back then in both cases the Fed eased and the economy recovered. The Fed has done all the easing a central back can do and the economy is still in an extremely weak state. The unemployment numbers are going to carry on rising, and we have a whole range of things coming -- defaults by corporations on a scale we have not seen since the time of the depression.

When it comes to equity markets, I am extremely skeptical when anyone tells me we’ve reached the bottom. There were 11 bear market rallies between 1929 and 1934 and it is terribly easy to be seduced by supposed green shoots. The media in particular will respond to noise. They will turn a blip into a sign of recovery. You have to look at the fundamentals of excessive debt. You have to look at extreme difficulty of causing a recovery in consumer demand in highly leveraged societies and realize that for that very reason this is very different from anything we’ve lived through.

Q In historical terms, is there any period you would compare this to?

I don’t think it’s like the ‘29 to ‘33 period partly because the policy response has been so completely different. In the depression of the early ‘30s the monetary and fiscal authorities practically everywhere did the worst possible things: They tightened monetary policy and tried to balance the budget. We’re not making those mistakes. Full marks to be Ben Bernanke for learning the lessons of the great depression. At the same time another eminent economist, Larry Summers, is ensuring that Keynesian policies are applied so let’s assume that the combined effects avoid a great depression of the early ‘30s style.

There is another possibility, which goes back to the 1870s. There was a great depression that began in 1873 with a financial panic: bank failures on both sides of the Atlantic. It was a very protracted depression. Economic performance and prices declined for about five and quarter years right up until 1878. It wasn’t as catastrophic as the early ‘30s. Output in the US only really declined for one of those years but prices and the equity market continued to decline gradually rather than precipitously. That seems to me a possible scenario.

Q: That sounds like Japan in the 1990s.

Japan’s parallel is quite illuminating here. It’s not inconceivable that you have something very similar in the west. You end up with zero interest rate policy, quantitative easing, massive increase in the public debt, and oh dear, nothing much happens. You avoid a complete collapse but you end of with growth that averages an anemic 1% in Japan’s case over a period of ten years. I suppose I could imagine that happening for five years in the western world. You end up with something that averages close to 1% rather than the 2 to three % that the administration forecasts for the medium term. That’s my expectation. Lets’ call it a slight depression.

Q What if deflation takes hold? Is there a spiral here that could get out of hand?
There is, which is why the 1870s example is not entirely reassuring. That was a period of deflation, and deflation is painful for debtors. In the 1870s there were not a huge number of people who were debtors. The principal ones were farmers, which is why we associate that period after 1873 with the rise of populist movements in the US and Europe. Today many, many more people are debtors. In fact the overwhelming majority of American households are to some degree leveraged. This time deflation will be very painful for many more people because the real debt burden would increase even with lower interest rates. That’s a scenario Ben Bernanke is justifiably worried about.

If consumers’ expectations become deflationary, if they start to expect prices to drop, which they already do in the real estate market, you postpone decisions. I’m doing this. I postponing any major purchase on the assumption prices will fall. We already are in a deflation. Most countries now have negative numbers of wholesale prices and some have consumer price indices that are in negative territory.

I think this will continue because and the shock to the global economy is much greater than the shock to the US economy. This is one of the great asymmetries of this crisis that many Americans do not fully appreciate. The shock in east Asia is far greater because the export models of east Asian economies have essentially broken down for Taiwan, for South Korea, above all for Japan. This already is a depression. Exports have already declined by 49% year on year for Japan. The east Asian economies and to a lesser extent the European economies are really plummeting. Capacity is simply not being using fully. That kind of drastic reduction in economic activity is really the driver of deflation.

Q You don’t see an inflation scenario?

Many people say “We’re worried about inflation because we see this massive expansion of the monetary base and it’s only a matter of time before we are the Weimar republic.” This is just completely wrong. The monetary base can be expanded as the Fed buys or lends against all kinds of toxic assets. Bernanke has already doubled the monetary base. You could treble it. Probably he could quadruple it. But that’s not the key to inflation. They key is what banks do and how consumers behave.

The only possible upticks in prices that I foresee in commodity markets where there is some kind of supply constraint. That may be true of oil; it’s certainly true of copper. And that in turn is simply a factor of China’s stimulus because China almost uniquely in the world is in a position to stimulate economic activity and that can feed straight into commodity markets.

Q Is China in a position to implement a meaningful Keynesian growth policy?
If any economy is able to be Keynesian, it is China’s. They have the capital controls. They have the spare capacity, in abundance, as far as the labor market is concerned. There’s plenty of public works they can do because the hinterland is still quasi-African. So there’s no shortage of worthwhile things to do, and it’s already happening. It’s pretty impressive, even in this fairly early stage in the process. Chinese consumer demand seems to be bouncing back. Yes, China has suffered in its exports but when you look at retail sales, they’re up. Industrial output is up. I think China has become more domestically driven. And that ‘s the right thing for them to do. If anything, they could do more to boost consumer demand, more to encourage Chinese households to save less and spend more. China desperately needs more financial intermediation. But the first steps have been taken with this plan for a proper system of universal health insurance could make a big difference.

Q: That marks pretty fundamental shifts for China’s economy.

If China can establish a model of state-stimulated, consumer-led growth, and wean itself off exports to the West, then what I call Chimerica, the magical marriage between China and America, can end in divorce. It will no longer be necessary for China’s growth to be dependent on a profligate U.S. consumer. That’s a really important part of the story. So, while the Chinese can be successful Keynesians, I’m not so sure the Americans can be. The Chinese look at the prospects for a bounce back of American consumption, I think they conclude, quite rightly, that it’s not going to happen. This is a big change.

...
 
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ffrhmd

Member
.... Niall

... continua ...

Q In that divorce, who suffers the most?
For China. the transition can’t happen overnight. The pain of restructuring will be very acute in those eastern zones, where they’ve sunk an enormous amount into manufacturing export industries. producing for export. But that’s a challenge their system is pretty well prepared to meet. It helps to have a communist party monopolizing power and a tradition of central planning. It seems to me they’ve been pursuing a traditional approach, almost Stalinist at core.

What drives China’s growth after all is state-led infrastructure investment. It’s been the case all along. The free market elements are parasitical on that. This is a model that can cope with the transition from exports to domestic demand.

The pain is going to be felt by China’s neighbors. That is the important point to grasp. The economies in the world that are suffering the most at the moment are the other east Asian economies. If China becomes more self sufficient, then the whole system looks quite different. The breakdown of globalization hurts smaller economies much more than bigger economies. That was true in the 1930s too. It’s really quite a troubled time to be Taiwan or South Korea, or for that matter Thailand of Vietnam.

Those are the people who will actually suffer. It’s a little bit like divorce is painful for the parents, but most traumatic for the children. But if you think of that analogy it works quite well. It’s not so much that the US will be devastated by the breakdown of Chimerica. It won’t be because the US ultimately is a pretty self-sufficient economy. It doesn’t rely on exports as much as these other economies we’re talking about.

Q: But couldn’t the consequences on the financial side still be pretty grave for the US?
I think that’s the divorce manifests itself for the US. Last year I think it’s true the Chinese bought around 400 billion dollars worth of dollar denominated bonds. Deutsche Bank estimates it will be a quarter of that this year and I think it will be even less. I don’t think China has any desire to increase holding of US government bonds if it can think of a better strategy, and a better strategy is obviously to go and buy copper mines in Africa.

Q: To what extent do you think the China’s leadership sees an opportunity on the world stage now that the US is on its knees economically and China’s coffers are full?

The mood is discernibly changing. The tone of official pronouncements is changing. Wen Jiabao’s speech at Davos struck me as being as saying the world has changed and there will no longer be a world centered around the profligate US and there has to be a new international financial architecture.
They do think more historically than Western leaders do and they are acutely aware that great shifts in power happen. Empires rise and empires fall over the very long run and this is China emerging from the deep historical trough of the 19th and early 20th century. And they must sense that this does accelerate the process whereby power is transferred from west to east. They know they are nowhere close militarily. One should not read too much into naval skirmishes in the south China sea. They don’t want to go there yet. They are nowhere near ready for an explicit showdown with the American military hyper-power. In terms of finance and economics I think they know they can be more assertive, that they really are in a powerful position.

Q Western responses to the crisis seems to be divided between free spending Keynesians and fiscal tightwads. Where do you stand on this divide?
I’ve spent much of my life battle the ghost of John Maynard Keynes, and I am critical of the shadow of Keynes once because I don’t think you can solve a crisis of excessive debt with more debt. We have a deficit this year in the US on the order of 12.3% of GDP. Now there has not been a deficit that large in relative terms since World War II. The effects have yet to be felt, but they are coming soon.
To me the critical issue that no one wants to talk about is an obvious contradiction between the monetary policy being pursued by the fed and the fiscal policy being pursued by the treasury. The fed’s objective is to keep long term rates down in order to keep mortgage rates low. Thus far he has been relatively successful in doing that.

The problem is that if the treasury issues 1.75 trillion dollars of new bonds this year, you are going to have upward pressure on yields and downward pressure on bond prices. It’s extremely hard for Bernanke to make his policy work in the face of this huge glut of new bonds. And it’s not just the US that’s doing this. The International bond market is going to be hit by a tsunami this year. I estimate that there will be somewhere in the region of 4.2 trillion dollars of new bond issues by the major developed economies, and I don’t really see how you can do that at a time when international capital is being depleted by the contraction of trade without having some kind of upward pressure on bond yields.

Q You’ve written that the US is beginning to look like Argentina circa 2004, when that country defaulted on its international debt. Is it really that bad?
I think the comparison is a good one. Argentina is the poster child for improvident governance . The Argentine default of 2004, when bondholders took a massive 65% haircut, sent a great shock wave through markets. Of course there is one big difference: the US can borrow in its own currency. That gives the US more leeway. The US doesn’t come to borrow and repay in a hard currency. So that’s one important difference.

The other difference is households, which are the little Argentinas of this story. American households are in a rather complex relationship to their creditors because mortgages were taken after the point of origin and then bundled together and then sliced and diced to produce mortgage-backed securities and those complex collateralized debt obligations. Until one can identify the creditor it is very hard to achieve any restructuring of mortgage debt. The biggest problem in addressing mortgages lies there. It’s hard to do that because of the complexity of the financial superstructure built on top of these mortgages.

....
 

ffrhmd

Member
... last..

..y fin...

Q: Your prescription, I believe, is mortgage relief and bank restructuring.

This is a really major problem that I think can only be dealt with only by pretty high-handed action on the part of the federal government. Nothing is impossible. This is where you get into Argentine territory. If the US were to take action simply to write down the mortgage debt of the US in order that 13.5 million Americans in negative equity could sigh with relief that would make everyone feel better except creditors. They would be facing the kind of default that Argentina creditors faced just five years ago. That’s the kind of thing that may have to be done in the end. What’s being attempted right now isn’t going to work.

There is the TALF and P-PIP. I am very dubious these measures will address the fundamental problem that there are some major financial institutions – big banks in particular – that by any meaningful measure are very close to insolvency. Secondly no matter how much money is drip fed into these institutions their assets just keep deteriorating. Let’s face it: real estate prices are falling at an annual rate of 18 or 19 percent and that’s residential real estate. The commercial real estate crisis is in its early stages and it will cause much more pain to the banks than the residential crisis. So there is a fundamental problem of excessively leveraged financial institutions that have basically had their capital base wiped out. We are in denial about that. TALF and P-PIP are not really sufficient to address the problem. They are basically screwed and at some point probably have to be taken into public ownership and restructured. Again, the bondholders are going to have haircut.

Early on in this crisis someone was foolish enough to say that the bondholders would not be wiped out; in fact, they would be made whole. I never understood why that should be. I don’t understand why someone who bought a bond should be sacrosanct, even at the expense of vast sums of taxpayers money. But that idea crept into the system and at some point we are going to have to be disabused of this idea just as Argentine bondholders had to take a haircut. It’s coming.

Q: Let’s turn to global finance. Is the US dollar going to get hammered?

The pessimists have been painting this scenario for a while. The assumption is that if the US current account deficit got to be this large sooner or later there will be a run on the dollar. But paradoxically the dollar has appreciated in this crisis. The worse the crisis got the stronger it became. So where would you out your money? The Chinese have asked themselves this. What else can we hold? Euros? Well clearly the problem with the Euro is Europe. Europe’s financial problems are worse than those of the US. The European banks are in a worst place than the US banks – a lot more leveraged, far fewer write downs, and much more exposed to eastern Europe and east Asia. The European bank crisis is coming and when it comes, it will be hard to see a good future for the European Union and the Euro. I don’t really buy the idea that the dollar yields to some other currency.

Q: In your book, “The Ascent of Money,” you suggest that we could be facing the global disorder of the sort that could reverse globalization and even set the stage for wars.

Globalization takes a while to start and get established. It took decades to get from the highly regulated economies of the 1970s seventies, to the free-wheeling, highly globalized economies of 2007. It takes a lot less time to destroy globalization. We found that out before. Globalization from the 1870s to 1914 was a pretty spectacular achievement with few reversals. When it reversed, it reversed at a far faster speed. And that’s what worries me.

We are already moving very rapidly away from globalization. The collapse of trade is the thing that most impresses me at the moment. We will also see it in migration. There will be dramatic declines in migration, and migrants will be forced economically, or in the case of Japan, by other means, to return to their countries.

The issue is to me is whether this year, on top of the macro-economic shock, we end up with a geopolitical shock. That would really finish things off.

Q: What kind of shock?

I can think of two immediately. One is the possibility that Israel will simply lose patience with Iran’s nuclear program and decide to take unilateral action. Many people say the United States can restrain or prevent it from doing this. I really struggle to see how. There have been very few occasions in the last twenty or thirty years when the U.S. effectively restrained Israel from doing anything. That’s one scenario that’s easy to imagine.

The other issue, of course, is Pakistan, which is an extraordinarily volatile and unstable place, a failed state in the making. And a source not only for nuclear proliferation, but for extreme Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. Which poses a real threat to the stability of India.

Then there is Russia’s stated policy of expanding its influence in the former Soviet Union. From Russia’s point of view, anything that increases the political risk in the world is helpful, because it will push energy prices up and that helps them. The Russians certainly would not shed a tear if Israel attacked Iran. It would suit them very well indeed—which is why they helped the Iranians with their nuclear program. They want Iran to be attacked and oil to go back up to 80 dollars a barrel. So if you just build a scenario of geopolitical crisis on top of a very frail global economy, it’s easy to see how this could get a lot worse.

Q: You’ve argued that US should be a great force for good in the world, as it has been at different junctures. Is the potential still there?

I have become more pessimistic about what the US can do. The analysis always was that if the US was going to have a problem of overstretch, it would be domestic and would have to do with excessive debt. The moment in (my books) “Empire” and “Colossus” when I argued for a more confident American empire was a relatively short lived as it turned out because all the things I worried about turned out to be right. The US is not likely to be as successful a liberal empire as Britain because it is so heavily reliant on foreign capital, because it has a manpower deficit -- Americans don’t want to go to hot, poor countries -- and above all because of its attention deficit disorder. It is very, very hard to turn Iraq into a stable state in four years, and that was always the time frame the American had in mind. When I would stand up in 2003 and say, “Do realize that you will have to be there for 40 years, like Britain was?” People would just gasp in horror.

Q: Are we looking at the start of an American decline?

Not quite, in the sense that this crisis affects others worse than the US. It certainly affects Europe worse. Power is relative. In that sense it’s all very unfair because it looks like the crisis was made in America but it hurts more or less everybody else, except China, more than the US.
Meanwhile what’s unquestionably likely to happen, is that China, provided it doesn’t succumb to some unexpected bout of instability, becomes something more like an equal partner, or rival. So you end up with a world with two major powers, one of which is the US, and the other of which is China.
We’re not in that world yet, because China’s GDP won’t catch up with that of the US for another decade or more, but that seems to be the trajectory that the world is on.
 

RafaYen

Active Member
Empieza otra semana.

Buenos días a [email protected]

Me ha alegrado mucho ver la gran cantidad de aportaciones, todas ellas de muy alto nivel, que se han realizado sobre el tema que se planteaba en el post del viernes. Esa es la esencia y el espíritu del foro: que todos aporten sus opiniones y puntos de vista, cosa que sin duda nos enriquece a todos. Muchas gracias a todos.

Se han mencionado varios temas interesantes como:
-La creación de una moneda mundial.
-Las reservas de divisas de China (y de Japón añadiría yo).
-La entrada de la Libra Esterlina en el Euro.

Todos y cada uno de ellos son puntos con la suficiente importancia como para desarrollarlos individualmente (en un post de viernes, jejeje). Todo se andará.

Insisto, y no quiero hacerme pesado, en que me han gustado mucho las aportaciones que se han hecho.

En segundo lugar, una pequeña puntualización. En uno de los párrafos finales digo:” En primer lugar, para el país saliente implicaría la creación de instituciones y estructuras financieras a nivel nacional que en su momento, con la incorporación a la moneda única, fueron abolidas. La primera de todas ellas sería el Banco Central del país en cuestión.”

Obviamente los bancos centrales no han sido abolidos ni demolidos. Lo que quería decir es que han perdido una parte muy importante de sus atribuciones. Esto es: todas las decisiones en lo referente a política monetaria (emisión de moneda, tipos de interés, devaluaciones y reevaluaciones, etc) han sido asumidas por el Banco Central Europeo el cual es el único órgano competente en estas materias. Esta pérdida de funciones, lógicamente, tiene que haber provocado una reestructuración interna en los bancos centrales de cada país, pero desde luego no ha supuesto su desaparición.

En tercer lugar,… el p*t* YEN.



Como se ve en las zonas marcadas con un círculo rojo, cada vez que ha habido una corrección la cotización ha pasado unas cuantas jornadas en una zona de “indecisión”.

Parece que estamos en eso. Llevamos 9 jornadas (con la de hoy) que el precio lo tenemos rondando el 134. Da la sensación de que el mercado estuviera esperando “algo”. A su vez, esta “lateralidad” nos acerca cada vez más a la directriz alcista. Parece lógico pensar que esta zona de indecisión se tendría que resolver más bien antes que después. Y también parece lógico pensar que la resolución debiera ser al alza.

El único estudio de la gráfica que me da algo “bueno” es la recta de regresión, que me indica un precio medio actual de casi 139. Los demás indicadores me salen un poco “feos”. Tan feos como es la gráfica “USD/JPY”. Pero para compensar la “EUR/USD” tiene “buena pinta”. Como de costumbre. Lo que gana una lo pierde la otra.

En fin. Que habrá que esperar (espero que ya poco) hasta ver la resolución.

Y para acabar, pues recordar que estamos casi en Julio (y luego Agosto). Sol. Playa. Arena. Calor. Refrescos. Helados. VACACIONES,… porque a los “niños” ya los tengo de vacaciones.

Creo que nos merecemos todos un descansito. Por lo menos descanso de los “viernes de RafaYen”. ¿no?

La información contenida en este documento se deriva de fuentes consideradas fiables y disponibles al publico en general. No hay garantías ni implícitas ni explicitas de que sean completas ni precisas.
Las opiniones expresadas en este documento están sujetas a cambios sin previo aviso.
Este documento ha sido creado para fines informativos y para su circulación privada si así se decide. Y no constituye ni es recomendación ni estrategía de ningún tipo para la negociación financiera



Saludos.
 
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fx-deline

Member
Es muy difícil que observemos un cambio en la tendencia del par luego de conocer los datos más relevantes en Japón. Aunque la producción de vehículos ha sido positiva, operadores aguardaban los resultados de la producción industrial de mayo, que han sido peor de lo esperado. En estos momentos, el cruce cotiza a 95.45 yenes por dólar. Si la tendencia se mantiene alcista, operadores centran su atención en las resistencias ubicadas en 96.58 y 97.27 yenes por dólar.
 
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