Siguiendo al YEN

[Yokohama]

Hola a [email protected], aunque llevo tiempo leyendo este foro, es la primera vez que escribo.
tengo un HMD con Bankinter en p... Yenes. Entre a 168 hace un año, con 215.000 € iniciales imaginaros lo que debo ahora, por que yo no quiero ni pensarlo.
Al grano, leyendo lo que he leido y siendo del monton para abajo en conocimientos de esto de las HMD, que hago, tal y como esta el mercado:
- Me espero a que rebote y a seguir como antes, cosa que dudo que supere el Y=150, a corto plazo.
- Me quedo sentadito esperando que bankinter haga uso de la clausulita del 10%.
- Me cambio de moneda.
- Compro yenes por si se apreciara mas.
-...etc

No se, haber que me recomendais, por que estoy algo despistado, de solo ver todo lo que debo...

Gracias

Bienvenido Joan. Lo importante es que decidas convencido por ti mismo.

Aquí tienes cientos de opiniones e información muy útil.

Lo de comprar yenes, tantos como puedas comprar y al precio más bajo que puedas hacerlo. Tener la pespectiva de una deuda controlada para los próximos 6, 8, 12 meses te va a dar una tranquilidad importante.

Para un perfil de mayor riesgo, tal vez esperar un rebote y salir con algo más de deuda pero con perspectivas de reengancharte a un mejor precio.

Cambio de moneda... difícil decisión en momentos de incertidumbre. Estudiarlo muy muy detenidamente. Tampoco sabes qué va a pasar en otras monedas.

No te preocupes por la cláusula hasta que te digan que la van a aplicar. Sufrimiento estéril. Si tienen la voluntad de aplicarla no quedará alternativa: la has firmado.

Ante todo, frialdad para analizar y para tomar la mejor decisión... y un poco de suerte, que nunca viene mal.

Buenas noches.

 

[Summer]

Gracias Krupier, pero yo me refería a entender que ventaja tiene el hecho de poder pasar a francos sin pasar por euros, ya que yo he hago cuentas con los valores de cambio y me resulta una consolidación de de deuda casi similar. Efectivamente tienes razón, soy de libor a 3 meses y me toca en febrero la revisión, por lo que sería en ese momento.

 

[alenkris]

Gracias Krupier, pero yo me refería a entender que ventaja tiene el hecho de poder pasar a francos sin pasar por euros, ya que yo he hago cuentas con los valores de cambio y me resulta una consolidación de de deuda casi similar. Efectivamente tienes razón, soy de libor a 3 meses y me toca en febrero la revisión, por lo que sería en ese momento.

La buena noticia entonces es que hasta dentro de un mes y pico no tienes que empezar a tomar decisiones.... a saber donde anda el yenesito de los c.... por esas fechas..... igual hasta lo vemos recuperarse del coma.
Yo acabo de tener la revisión así que hasta marzo no puedo hacer nada. Invertiré estos tres meses en estudiar los posts y culturizarme, ver como evoluciona el franco.... volverme loca, vamos.... porque en lo que si tienen razon todos es que hay que estudiarlo bien, pero que muy muy bien.

SUERTE

 

[albertin]

Hola a [email protected], aunque llevo tiempo leyendo este foro, es la primera vez que escribo.
tengo un HMD con Bankinter en p... Yenes. Entre a 168 hace un año, con 215.000 € iniciales imaginaros lo que debo ahora, por que yo no quiero ni pensarlo.
Bienvenido al club, no te reconfortará saber que no estás solo.
Esos 36MM de yenes que debes, ahora
Al grano, leyendo lo que he leido y siendo del monton para abajo en conocimientos de esto de las HMD, que hago, tal y como esta el mercado:
- Me espero a que rebote y a seguir como antes, cosa que dudo que supere el Y=150, a corto plazo.
se habla mucho de un rebote, quien sabe si llegará, ojalá,
con lo cual igual tendríamos opción de elegir. De momento está jodida la cosa.
Buf, lo de cambiar la hmd a euros, tal como te has pasado de la claúsula no te dejarían seguro, sin amortizar el exceso o algo parecido
- Me quedo sentadito esperando que bankinter haga uso de la clausulita del 10%.
Buf, reza por que eso no suceda, si es que no quieres que suceda, claro.
Y que no tengas problemas con las cuotas, vete pagando religiosamente mes a mes
- Me cambio de moneda.
Hay que tener los huevos de un toro para hacer eso ahora mismo, bufff, yo estoy como tú, y no los tengo, soy un gallinaceo
- Compro yenes por si se apreciara mas.
Aquí se habla mucho de eso, de "hacer los deberes", no se, estándo tan jodidos, podría ser una opción
-...etc
etc,etc...

No se, haber que me recomendais, por que estoy algo despistado, de solo ver todo lo que debo...
Solamente al cambio de hoy tienes al debe en euros una cantidad de pasta que si te lo dicen hace dos meses, hubieras pensado que el que te lo estaba diciendo estaba tonto.

Nadie tiene la respuesta,
de momento pinta negro, y para más adelante, parece que pinta negro.
Who knows....

Suerte para ambos !!!

Gracias
No se puede decir nada,
la que nos ha caido ha sido parda...
y reza para que el banco se olvide de ti

Saludos/Alberto

 

[ern]

Bienvenido Joan. Lo importante es que decidas convencido por ti mismo.

Aquí tienes cientos de opiniones e información muy útil.

Lo de comprar yenes, tantos como puedas comprar y al precio más bajo que puedas hacerlo. Tener la pespectiva de una deuda controlada para los próximos 6, 8, 12 meses te va a dar una tranquilidad importante.

Para un perfil de mayor riesgo, tal vez esperar un rebote y salir con algo más de deuda pero con perspectivas de reengancharte a un mejor precio.

Cambio de moneda... difícil decisión en momentos de incertidumbre. Estudiarlo muy muy detenidamente. Tampoco sabes qué va a pasar en otras monedas.

No te preocupes por la cláusula hasta que te digan que la van a aplicar. Sufrimiento estéril. Si tienen la voluntad de aplicarla no quedará alternativa: la has firmado.

Ante todo, frialdad para analizar y para tomar la mejor decisión... y un poco de suerte, que nunca viene mal.

Buenas noches.

Como mola el Sur de Madrid. ¿De dónde eres -si no es mucho preguntar-? Eres para mi una de las voces más valiosas de este nuestro foro.

 

[davite]

Hola a todos. Hace tiempo que os sigo. Esta es mi primera intervención, me parece todo muy interesante y procuro seguiros en lo que puedo, no tengo conocimientos profundos de macroeconomia, de la doméstica sí. Tengo hmd con el B Popular, entré a 161. Yenero. Mi situación es similar a la de muchos de vosotros. A verlas venir.

 

[ffrhmd]

Roubini & Deflación

En este artículo publicado en el "Financial Times", Roubini, habla de como evitarla.

How to avoid the horrors of ‘stag-deflation’By Nouriel Roubini

Published: December 2 2008 19:53 | Last updated: December 2 2008 19:53

The US and the global economy are at risk of a severe stag-deflation, a deadly combination of economic stagnation/recession and deflation.

A severe global recession will lead to deflationary pressures. Falling demand will lead to lower inflation as companies cut prices to reduce excess inventory. Slack in labour markets from rising unemployment will control labour costs and wage growth. Further slack in commodity markets as prices fall will lead to sharply lower inflation. Thus inflation in advanced economies will fall towards the 1 per cent level that leads to concerns about deflation.

Deflation is dangerous as it leads to a liquidity trap, a deflation trap and a debt deflation trap: nominal policy rates cannot fall below zero and thus monetary policy becomes ineffective. We are already in this liquidity trap since the Fed funds target rate is still 1 per cent but the effective one is close to zero as the Federal Reserve has flooded the financial system with liquidity; and by early 2009 the target Fed funds rate will formally hit 0 per cent. Also, in deflation the fall in prices means the real cost of capital is high – despite policy rates close to zero – leading to further falls in consumption and investment. This fall in demand and prices leads to a vicious circle: incomes and jobs are cut, leading to further falls in demand and prices (a deflation trap); and the real value of nominal debts rises (a debt deflation trap) making debtors’ problems more severe and leading to a rising risk of corporate and household defaults that will exacerbate credit losses of financial institutions.

As traditional monetary policy becomes ineffective, other unorthodox policies have been used: massive provision of liquidity to financial institutions to unclog the liquidity crunch and reduce the spread between short-term market rates and policy rates; quasi-fiscal policies to bail out investors, lenders and borrowers. And even more unorthodox “crazy” policy actions become necessary to reduce the rising spread between long-term interest rates on government bonds and policy rates and the high spread of short-term and long-term market rates (mortgage rates, commercial paper, consumer credit) relative to short-term and long-term government bonds.

To reduce the former spread the central bank needs to commit to maintain policy rates close to zero for a long time and/or start outright purchases of government bonds; to reduce the latter it needs to spread massive liquidity, such as by direct purchases of commercial paper, mortgages, mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and other asset-backed securities. The Fed has already crossed that bridge with facilities that are aimed at reducing short-term market rates, such as Libor spreads; it has now moved to influence long-term mortgage rates by buying MBSs.

Traditionally, central banks are the lenders of last resort but they are becoming the lenders of first and only resort, as banks are not lending. Central banks are becoming the only lenders in the land. With consumption by households and capital spending by corporations collapsing, governments will soon become the spenders of first and only resort as fiscal deficits surge.

The financial crisis has already become global as financial links transmitted US shocks globally. The overall credit losses are likely to be close to a staggering $2,000bn. Thus, unless financial institutions are rapidly recapitalised by governments the credit crunch will become even more severe as losses mount faster than recapitalisation.

But with governments and central banks bringing private sector losses on to their balance sheets, fiscal deficits will top $1,000bn for the US in the next two years. The Fed and the Treasury are taking a massive amount of credit risk, endangering the long-term solvency of the US government.

In the next few months, the flow of macroeconomic and earnings news will be much worse than expected. The credit crunch will get worse, with de*leveraging continuing as hedge funds and other leveraged players are forced to sell assets into illiquid and distressed markets, leading to further cascading falls in prices, other insolvent financial institutions going bust and a few emerging market economies entering a full-blown financial crisis.

The worst is not behind us: 2009 will be a painful year of a global recession, deflation and bankruptcies. Only very aggressive and co-ordinated policy actions will ensure the global economy recovers in 2010 rather than facing protracted stagnation and deflation.

 

[ffrhmd]

Opiniones...diversas

Al respecto, hay diversas opiniones;

Risk of Stagflation vs. Deflation:

ML: Global policy reaction to the financial crisis has been so aggressive,determined and persistent, that it is highly likely we avoid deflation, and eventually end up with higher inflation.To paraphrase Minsky, "fears of deflation are inflationary"

GS: The opening up of spare capacity has been historically associated with significant downward pressure on inflation. Given that we expect spare capacity to continue to increase at least till Q4 2009, inflation is unlikely to be a serious issue

Roubini: U.S. and global economy are at risk of a severe stag-deflation. A severe global recession will lead to deflationary pressures. Falling demand will lead to lower inflation as companies cut prices to reduce excess inventory. Slack in labor markets from rising unemployment will control labor costs and wage growth. Further slack in commodity markets as prices fall will lead to sharply lower inflation. Thus inflation in advanced economies will fall towards the 1% level that leads to concerns about deflation

CA: Great Moderation and combination of downward shocks (oil, property, financial) to growth will slow inflation. Stagflation unlikely because wages are no longer indexed to inflation like in 1970s when second round effects led to inflation persistence

MS: Inflation will be lower in the near term but there is now high risk of high inflation in the long term. Why? 1) It is doubtful that policymakers will be able and willing to quickly and fully reverse easing when things stabilize. 2) The likely sharp rise in government debt in several countries should increase political pressures on central banks to keep interest rates low. 3) If potential GDP growth has slowed a lot, global recession will not create as much slack and disinflationary pressures as is widely believed

JPMorgan: It's normal for inflation to lag behind growth for quarters after global economy moves from strength to weakness. Slowing growth means slowing inflation eventually. Currency depreciation may lead to higher imported inflation in emerging markets


Comparisons with 1970s Great Stagflation:
Like the 1970s, 1) inflation was driven higher by commodities with negative supply shocks (though this time coming from poor weather, trade barriers and environmental regulations rather than OPEC) and 2) growth is slowing globally led by U.S.

Unlike the 1970s, 1) no wage-price spiral, 2) no Nixonian price controls in the U.S. (but controls do exist elsewhere), 3) commodity price rises also due to positive demand shock, 4) credit crisis and asset deflation in developed world spreading globally, 5) falling inflation in developed world

En este artículo publicado en el "Financial Times", Roubini, habla de como evitarla.

How to avoid the horrors of ‘stag-deflation’By Nouriel Roubini

Published: December 2 2008 19:53 | Last updated: December 2 2008 19:53

The US and the global economy are at risk of a severe stag-deflation, a deadly combination of economic stagnation/recession and deflation.

A severe global recession will lead to deflationary pressures. Falling demand will lead to lower inflation as companies cut prices to reduce excess inventory. Slack in labour markets from rising unemployment will control labour costs and wage growth. Further slack in commodity markets as prices fall will lead to sharply lower inflation. Thus inflation in advanced economies will fall towards the 1 per cent level that leads to concerns about deflation.

Deflation is dangerous as it leads to a liquidity trap, a deflation trap and a debt deflation trap: nominal policy rates cannot fall below zero and thus monetary policy becomes ineffective. We are already in this liquidity trap since the Fed funds target rate is still 1 per cent but the effective one is close to zero as the Federal Reserve has flooded the financial system with liquidity; and by early 2009 the target Fed funds rate will formally hit 0 per cent. Also, in deflation the fall in prices means the real cost of capital is high – despite policy rates close to zero – leading to further falls in consumption and investment. This fall in demand and prices leads to a vicious circle: incomes and jobs are cut, leading to further falls in demand and prices (a deflation trap); and the real value of nominal debts rises (a debt deflation trap) making debtors’ problems more severe and leading to a rising risk of corporate and household defaults that will exacerbate credit losses of financial institutions.

As traditional monetary policy becomes ineffective, other unorthodox policies have been used: massive provision of liquidity to financial institutions to unclog the liquidity crunch and reduce the spread between short-term market rates and policy rates; quasi-fiscal policies to bail out investors, lenders and borrowers. And even more unorthodox “crazy” policy actions become necessary to reduce the rising spread between long-term interest rates on government bonds and policy rates and the high spread of short-term and long-term market rates (mortgage rates, commercial paper, consumer credit) relative to short-term and long-term government bonds.

To reduce the former spread the central bank needs to commit to maintain policy rates close to zero for a long time and/or start outright purchases of government bonds; to reduce the latter it needs to spread massive liquidity, such as by direct purchases of commercial paper, mortgages, mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and other asset-backed securities. The Fed has already crossed that bridge with facilities that are aimed at reducing short-term market rates, such as Libor spreads; it has now moved to influence long-term mortgage rates by buying MBSs.

Traditionally, central banks are the lenders of last resort but they are becoming the lenders of first and only resort, as banks are not lending. Central banks are becoming the only lenders in the land. With consumption by households and capital spending by corporations collapsing, governments will soon become the spenders of first and only resort as fiscal deficits surge.

The financial crisis has already become global as financial links transmitted US shocks globally. The overall credit losses are likely to be close to a staggering $2,000bn. Thus, unless financial institutions are rapidly recapitalised by governments the credit crunch will become even more severe as losses mount faster than recapitalisation.

But with governments and central banks bringing private sector losses on to their balance sheets, fiscal deficits will top $1,000bn for the US in the next two years. The Fed and the Treasury are taking a massive amount of credit risk, endangering the long-term solvency of the US government.

In the next few months, the flow of macroeconomic and earnings news will be much worse than expected. The credit crunch will get worse, with de*leveraging continuing as hedge funds and other leveraged players are forced to sell assets into illiquid and distressed markets, leading to further cascading falls in prices, other insolvent financial institutions going bust and a few emerging market economies entering a full-blown financial crisis.

The worst is not behind us: 2009 will be a painful year of a global recession, deflation and bankruptcies. Only very aggressive and co-ordinated policy actions will ensure the global economy recovers in 2010 rather than facing protracted stagnation and deflation.

 

[Alexito]

Una pregunta , un poco "burra":

Apreciáis realmente un interés a nivel global (gobiernos, banca, estamentos dedicados,...) en que esto se arregle para todos?

Estoy empezando a dudarlo seriamente. Lo del Yen, señores, ya no tiene nombre.

Es como meterte ayahuasca con un litro de vodka y fumarte un peta, para luego meterte una raya de coca y decir que ha nevado en sierra morena.

De locos.

 

[Krupier]

Gracias Krupier, pero yo me refería a entender que ventaja tiene el hecho de poder pasar a francos sin pasar por euros, ya que yo he hago cuentas con los valores de cambio y me resulta una consolidación de de deuda casi similar. Efectivamente tienes razón, soy de libor a 3 meses y me toca en febrero la revisión, por lo que sería en ese momento.

Si pasas por el euro primero, te cobran un 1% de fixing (de yenes a euros) + otro 1 % por pasar del euro al franco suizo. En total sería un 2% del principal, mientras que si cambias directo, "sólo" es un 1%, así que ya me dirás si tiene o no ventaja de poder cambiar directamente de divisa sin pasar por el euro.

 

[soros]

Si pasas por el euro primero, te cobran un 1% de fixing (de yenes a euros) + otro 1 % por pasar del euro al franco suizo. En total sería un 2% del principal, mientras que si cambias directo, "sólo" es un 1%, así que ya me dirás si tiene o no ventaja de poder cambiar directamente de divisa sin pasar por el euro.

de las dos formas te cobran doble fixing, ya que si pasas directamente te cogen el cambio vendedor del una divisa y el comprador de la otra, total un 2% que se esfume de tu capital

 

[soros]

La cosa no pinta muy bien , ni el rebote de las bolsas hace apreciarse al dolar.
EL cambio USD-JPY se dirige peligrosamente al soporte de 90, y creo que estaran tentados de perforarlo y crear panico.

Despues tenemos el rebajon de tipos del BCE se vana plantar segun las quinielas en el 2.5 , o sea que el diferencial de euribor y libor yen se qujedara en el 2% aprox. Asi que mi margen de maniobra para ahorrar intereses ya es bajo , por tanto al minimo rebote del eur-jpy me cambiare a aeuros , ya no espero el 140 , el 126 ya me vale

 

[Juno]

Que fuerte lo de esta gente:

http://simplesinriesgo.blogspot.com/2008/12/nueva-tctica-con-la-hipoteca-en-yenes.html

 

[Juno]

Buenas noticias para los que estáis aguantando en yenes, se espera un importante rebote:

http://elanalisistecnico.com/analisis-cambio-euro-yen-2/

 

[crainar]

Hola a todos, llevo tiempo sin aparecer y espero dar esperanzas, despues de mucho leer, para nada la verdad, lo único claro que me quedo para los que estamos enganchados en Yenes es seguir comprando cuando se deprecie (con que llegue a 125 compramos un par de cuotas) y no entrar en modo pánico, una de las cosas mas importantes de las crisis es que estas antes o despues pasan y para los que aguantan y salen de ellas suelen ver mas de 1 o 2 cielos abiertos despues con miles de posibilidades.

Ya vereis como en un tiempo veremos la luz, eso si, no espereis a salir de esta crisis en 1 mes, pero tampoco va a durar 2 años.

Vamos!!!! WE CAN!!!!

 

[Krupier]

de las dos formas te cobran doble fixing, ya que si pasas directamente te cogen el cambio vendedor del una divisa y el comprador de la otra, total un 2% que se esfume de tu capital

No quiero generar polémica, pero si pasas de yenes a francos suizos sólo te aplican un 1%, en concreto el cambio comprador de francos suizos, para que salgan más francos suizos.
Este cambio comprador te lo aplican al principal de tu deuda en yenes.

 

[JOSE08100]

perez129 una pregunta: tu contrataste un seguro de cambio y luego lo anulaste, cierto? ¿cual fue el coste de esa anulación, por favor? para qué importe?
Estabas en Banco de Valencia, verdad? Gracias.

Voy a contratarlo con Barclays, pero si para el dia 29 (fecha de mis cuotas) rebota hasta p. eje. 125 y lo anulo, me pide la diferencia (eurjpy hoy=117), lo que sería sobre los 130 mil pendiente ¡¡9.500 eur!!
Vamos me parece una barbaridad.

 

[yopero]

Que fuerte lo de esta gente:

http://simplesinriesgo.blogspot.com/2008/12/nueva-tctica-con-la-hipoteca-en-yenes.html

jaaaaaaaaajajajjjajajajajajaaaj, nada mejor que unas buenas risas para empezar el dia.

La foto esta Sublime!!!

 

[JOSE08100]

La cosa no pinta muy bien , ni el rebote de las bolsas hace apreciarse al dolar.
EL cambio USD-JPY se dirige peligrosamente al soporte de 90, y creo que estaran tentados de perforarlo y crear panico.

Despues tenemos el rebajon de tipos del BCE se vana plantar segun las quinielas en el 2.5 , o sea que el diferencial de euribor y libor yen se qujedara en el 2% aprox. Asi que mi margen de maniobra para ahorrar intereses ya es bajo , por tanto al minimo rebote del eur-jpy me cambiare a aeuros , ya no espero el 140 , el 126 ya me vale

¿de verdad se va apreciar? ¿o tenemos que salir todos cagando leches antes de que se la pegue por debajo de 90?

 

[Jesus AT]

Con tu permiso ffrhmd me gustaria debatir esto. Si alguien mas se apunta. Muchas veces estas cosas pasan como una exalacion y no se valora lo que realmente valen, o las leemos los que podemos y punto dejandolas pasar.....


Pues si, estaba cantado. El coco está llamando a la puerta y tiene un nombre.... "deflacion" Hace varios cientos de post sono la palabra pero parece que no se le dio la importancia que tenia.

Mientras el trichi trataba de contener la inflacion no bajando los tipos e incluso sobiendolos cuando estabamos abocados al desastre. Ocurria que todos miraban al otro lado.... nada de crisis, mas bien desaceleracion... no pasa nada y estamos en la champions de la economia mundial.. cuando baje el precio del crudo esto se arregla!!! tranquilos!!!!

Esto anterior no es por politizar y para nada lo pretendo. Es mas este tipo de mensajes era generalizado por cualquier gobierno sea de la indole que sea.... aqui lo que importa es la silla.


Consecuencia de todo esto... que cuando los tipos bajan ya no sirve de nada. Resulta ahora que una inflacion del 1% nos pone nerviosos pa cagarse con estos mandameses.... un 1% de inflacion nos aboca a un paso de de la deflacion.......

Saludos y suerte a [email protected] sin excepcion,

En este artículo publicado en el "Financial Times", Roubini, habla de como evitarla.

How to avoid the horrors of ‘stag-deflation’By Nouriel Roubini

Published: December 2 2008 19:53 | Last updated: December 2 2008 19:53

The US and the global economy are at risk of a severe stag-deflation, a deadly combination of economic stagnation/recession and deflation.

A severe global recession will lead to deflationary pressures. Falling demand will lead to lower inflation as companies cut prices to reduce excess inventory. Slack in labour markets from rising unemployment will control labour costs and wage growth. Further slack in commodity markets as prices fall will lead to sharply lower inflation. Thus inflation in advanced economies will fall towards the 1 per cent level that leads to concerns about deflation.

Deflation is dangerous as it leads to a liquidity trap, a deflation trap and a debt deflation trap: nominal policy rates cannot fall below zero and thus monetary policy becomes ineffective. We are already in this liquidity trap since the Fed funds target rate is still 1 per cent but the effective one is close to zero as the Federal Reserve has flooded the financial system with liquidity; and by early 2009 the target Fed funds rate will formally hit 0 per cent. Also, in deflation the fall in prices means the real cost of capital is high – despite policy rates close to zero – leading to further falls in consumption and investment. This fall in demand and prices leads to a vicious circle: incomes and jobs are cut, leading to further falls in demand and prices (a deflation trap); and the real value of nominal debts rises (a debt deflation trap) making debtors’ problems more severe and leading to a rising risk of corporate and household defaults that will exacerbate credit losses of financial institutions.

As traditional monetary policy becomes ineffective, other unorthodox policies have been used: massive provision of liquidity to financial institutions to unclog the liquidity crunch and reduce the spread between short-term market rates and policy rates; quasi-fiscal policies to bail out investors, lenders and borrowers. And even more unorthodox “crazy” policy actions become necessary to reduce the rising spread between long-term interest rates on government bonds and policy rates and the high spread of short-term and long-term market rates (mortgage rates, commercial paper, consumer credit) relative to short-term and long-term government bonds.

To reduce the former spread the central bank needs to commit to maintain policy rates close to zero for a long time and/or start outright purchases of government bonds; to reduce the latter it needs to spread massive liquidity, such as by direct purchases of commercial paper, mortgages, mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and other asset-backed securities. The Fed has already crossed that bridge with facilities that are aimed at reducing short-term market rates, such as Libor spreads; it has now moved to influence long-term mortgage rates by buying MBSs.

Traditionally, central banks are the lenders of last resort but they are becoming the lenders of first and only resort, as banks are not lending. Central banks are becoming the only lenders in the land. With consumption by households and capital spending by corporations collapsing, governments will soon become the spenders of first and only resort as fiscal deficits surge.

The financial crisis has already become global as financial links transmitted US shocks globally. The overall credit losses are likely to be close to a staggering $2,000bn. Thus, unless financial institutions are rapidly recapitalised by governments the credit crunch will become even more severe as losses mount faster than recapitalisation.

But with governments and central banks bringing private sector losses on to their balance sheets, fiscal deficits will top $1,000bn for the US in the next two years. The Fed and the Treasury are taking a massive amount of credit risk, endangering the long-term solvency of the US government.

In the next few months, the flow of macroeconomic and earnings news will be much worse than expected. The credit crunch will get worse, with de*leveraging continuing as hedge funds and other leveraged players are forced to sell assets into illiquid and distressed markets, leading to further cascading falls in prices, other insolvent financial institutions going bust and a few emerging market economies entering a full-blown financial crisis.

The worst is not behind us: 2009 will be a painful year of a global recession, deflation and bankruptcies. Only very aggressive and co-ordinated policy actions will ensure the global economy recovers in 2010 rather than facing protracted stagnation and deflation.