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darkpollo

Member
:confused::confused::confused:Aunque mi querido darkpollo me contestó que mi hoja de cálculo va mal (¡ojalá!) he descargado la de Rul y a mí mis cálculos me dan lo mismo que a él si no exactamente parecidosyo me pregunto lo siguiente: si mi hoja de cálculo no va mal actualmente debo 314.412 € a 128 entrada y 1.60 libor. Si el mes que viene se pone aprox en lo que se estima (-10% a 115,43) yo ya voy debiendo 347.836,84 además del aumento de la cuota; llegada la 6ª cuota ya debería 526.768,64 y estaría pagando una cuota más alta que en euros* y debería 178.931 € más (siempre con la esperanza de que no baje más de un 10%). Mi hoja va bien o mal?Perdón que pregunte....pero, qué alternativa tienen los que entraron a 160? No es mejor salirse corrrrrrriendo de aquí.Lo siento, ya sé que son 30 años, también sé que tuve una buena entrada a 128 (pero el momento desde luego el más inapropiado).
[/QUOTE]

me temo que no fui yo.
Fue jorgemac
http://www.euribor.com.es/foro/showpost.php?p=12403&postcount=6946
A ver si el lunes me la puedo bajar y le echo un vistazo, pero parece demasiada variacion. Algo raro haces... :p
Con entrada a 128 yo no me movia ni un pelo. Es una gran entrada y pagas menos que en euros seguro por mucho que baje.
 

trapaga

Well-Known Member
eso de que siempre debera 347.866 si sigue a 115 es muy relativo, cada mes que pase debera menos :D.

si con la hoja excel, no te salen bien las cuentas, bien por que no pongas bien los numeros, bien por que no aciertes las combinaciones :D, siempre quedan las calculadoras y el lapiz y papel.

si tu principal fue 314.412 x 128 = 40.244.736 yenes que al 1.6% de interes anual durante 30 años, hace una cuota de 141.265 yenes ( que tendras que conseguir como sea ), luego 40.244.736 - 141.265 = 40.157.876 y esta es la cantidad que debes al cabo de un mes.

si quieres marearte con futuribles cambios, adelante, solo es cuestion de dividir esta cantidad por el cambio que tengas cada dia o cada periodo que consideres hasta que pages la proxima cuota, de tal forma que 40.157.876/115,43=347.898 pero 40.157.876/110=365.071 y asin sucesivamente.

lo unico cierto es que cuando llegue el segundo mes, el banco te calculara una nueva cuota sobre los 40.157.876 y el libor que te corresponda. imaginemos que es el 1,7 entonces 40.157.876 al 1,7% de interes anual durante 29 años y 11 meses, hace una cuota de 143.247 yenes ( que tendras que conseguir como sea ), luego 40.157.876 - 143.247 = 40.014.629 y esta es la cantidad que debes al cabo de dos meses.

si quieres marearte con futuribles cambios, adelante, solo es cuestion de dividir esta cantidad por el cambio que tengas cada dia o cada periodo que consideres hasta que pages la proxima cuota, de tal forma que 40.014.629/115.43=346.657 pero si 40.014.629/128=312.614 ( ala, ya debes menos que al entrar).

siguiendo con tu preocupacion, para que 40.014.629 te supusiesen los 526.768,64 que dices, el cambio deberia ser: 40.014.629/526.768,64 = 75,96

otra cosa es que quieras salir
por que pienses que se pondra a ese valor :D


saludos
 

Patxi

Member
Darkpollo Te felicito, una gran pagina. una pagina de guevo.:)
 

trapaga

Well-Known Member
trocito

se ha ido de marcha y esta
, mañana cuando se le pase veremos como le ha sentado la salida.

si con un poco de suerte se encontro con
y luego
, se nos levanta animadito y.........

saludos
 

darkpollo

Member
eso de que siempre debera 347.866 si sigue a 115 es muy relativo, cada mes que pase debera menos :D.

si con la hoja excel, no te salen bien las cuentas, bien por que no pongas bien los numeros, bien por que no aciertes las combinaciones :D, siempre quedan las calculadoras y el lapiz y papel.

si tu principal fue 314.412 x 128 = 40.244.736 yenes que al 1.6% de interes anual durante 30 años, hace una cuota de 141.265 yenes ( que tendras que conseguir como sea ), luego 40.244.736 - 141.265 = 40.157.876 y esta es la cantidad que debes al cabo de un mes.
Una cosa, lo que debes se reduce solo en la parte proporcional de principal que amortizas. Es decir, si pagas 141.265 yenes al mes, una parte son intereses y esos no los descuentas al mes siguiente.
No he hecho la cuenta así que no se si ya habías contado con eso, pero me da la sensación al leerlo que no.
Por aclarar. :)
Lo demás perfecto. :p
 
Tengo una pregunta , que no se donde realizarla, a lo mejor os parece una tonteria.
Los bancos y cajas estan dando en torno a un 4,5 y 7% para depositos , si se dice que para mitad del año que viene el euribor estará en torno al 3%, de donde pagaran la diferencia? Quiere decir que dentro de un año estaran peor los bancos?
 
:confused::confused::confused:Aunque mi querido darkpollo me contestó que mi hoja de cálculo va mal (¡ojalá!) he descargado la de Rul y a mí mis cálculos me dan lo mismo que a él si no exactamente parecidosyo me pregunto lo siguiente: si mi hoja de cálculo no va mal actualmente debo 314.412 € a 128 entrada y 1.60 libor. Si el mes que viene se pone aprox en lo que se estima (-10% a 115,43) yo ya voy debiendo 347.836,84 además del aumento de la cuota; llegada la 6ª cuota ya debería 526.768,64 y estaría pagando una cuota más alta que en euros* y debería 178.931 € más (siempre con la esperanza de que no baje más de un 10%). Mi hoja va bien o mal?Perdón que pregunte....pero, qué alternativa tienen los que entraron a 160? No es mejor salirse corrrrrrriendo de aquí.Lo siento, ya sé que son 30 años, también sé que tuve una buena entrada a 128 (pero el momento desde luego el más inapropiado).
[/QUOTE]

Hola POKEMON, tu entrada está muy bien, no te "comas el tarro" que te quedan 30 años por delante, te dejo un enlace de un simulador en el que metes tus datos al momento de la firma de tu hipo y luego vas variando los posibles valores del cambio del yen y así sabras cuando te supone cada cuota para determinados valores de la divisa, a 125, a 100, a 90 a lo que quieras.
Además te saca el cálculo de lo que amortizas, intereses que pagas, y te hace una comparación con una en euros.
Un saludo.

SIMULADOR DE HIPOTECAS Y PISOS
 

fito

Member
:confused:Aunque mi querido darkpollo me contestó que mi hoja de cálculo va mal (¡ojalá!) he descargado la de Rul y a mí mis cálculos me dan lo mismo que a él si no exactamente parecidosyo me pregunto lo siguiente: si mi hoja de cálculo no va mal actualmente debo 314.412 € a 128 entrada y 1.60 libor. Si el mes que viene se pone aprox en lo que se estima (-10% a 115,43) yo ya voy debiendo 347.836,84 además del aumento de la cuota; llegada la 6ª cuota ya debería 526.768,64 y estaría pagando una cuota más alta que en euros* y debería 178.931 € más (siempre con la esperanza de que no baje más de un 10%). Mi hoja va bien o mal?Perdón que pregunte....pero, qué alternativa tienen los que entraron a 160? No es mejor salirse corrrrrrriendo de aquí.Lo siento, ya sé que son 30 años, también sé que tuve una buena entrada a 128 (pero el momento desde luego el más inapropiado).
[/QUOTE]

Estás un poco liado
Te paso un resumen de 15 meses para que te hagas una idea.
No se que machacas en las plantillas, sobre todo la de Rul, que seguro que está bien.
Te paso el resumen que te he hecho bien,
Aquí no hay fórmulas, para que no las puedas borrar jodio :D
Me largo a los columpios con la peque, que me están echando bronca por tu culpa

saludos
:cool:Ver el adjunto 195
 
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ffrhmd

Member
¿Y despues del G20 qué? Es el turno de Obama

Despues de la gestión de un "mamonazo" como Bush, es el turno de Obama ( excelente reportaje).
 

ffrhmd

Member
"Doctor" Obama

Despues de la gestión de un "mamonazo" como Bush, es el turno de Obama ( excelente reportaje).
La "economía mundial" es un "enfermo" que hay que "diagnosticar" antes de "operarle en quirofano" por el Doctor Obama. La "operación" es de vida o muerte para el capitalismo, y durará meses.
 

ffrhmd

Member
.... y la China que? ...

China y la crisis.

Nov 14th, 2008 | BEIJING -- China said Friday it could work with the International Monetary Fund to help countries hurt by the global financial crisis, suggesting it might heed appeals to contribute to a bailout fund.

As President Hu Jintao prepared for a Washington meeting of leaders to discuss a response to the crisis, Vice Finance Minister Yi Gang sounded constructive, saying China was prepared to work with other countries. But at the same time, Yi reiterated that the most important step Beijing can take will be to keep its own economy stable.

"We are positively taking part in rescue actions for this international financial crisis," Yi said at a news conference. "There are many ways to do this. We can do it bilaterally, such as currency swaps. And we can do it multilaterally, such as taking part in activities on the platform of the IMF."

Hu is expected to come under pressure at the weekend meeting to use China's $2 trillion in reserves to help expand an IMF stability fund. Beijing has yet to respond directly to such suggestions but says Hu will press Western leaders to give developing countries a bigger role in such global financial institutions, a measure that analysts say might be a condition for a Chinese contribution.

Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso said Friday that Japan is ready to lend up to $100 billion to the IMF to support nations reeling from the global financial crisis. The IMF has dipped into its reserves fund to provide emergency loans to Iceland, Hungary and Ukraine worth more than $30 billion.

Yi repeated Beijing's insistence that keeping its economy growing will be an important contribution to global stability. China announced a nearly $600 billion package on Sunday to boost economic growth through higher spending on construction and social programs.

"We have worked to stabilize the growth of China's economy. We believe this will be our biggest contribution to the international response to the financial crisis," Yi said.

Also Friday, another official said weakness in China's economy is worsening and the government faces a severe challenge as it tries to avert a sharp downturn.

"The downturn trend in our economy is more obvious, especially since September. We hope a rapid downturn in growth will not occur," Mu Hong, a deputy chairman of the nation's main planning agency, said at the news conference with Yi.

Mu expressed confidence the stimulus package would help the country weather the global downturn. But he said, "This international financial crisis is a new challenge for us. It is a severe challenge."

Beijing is moving quickly to launch the package and will distribute most of a planned 100 billion yuan ($15 billion) in additional government spending within the next two weeks, Mu said. He said the money will be spent on housing, rural development, highways, public health and environmental protection.

The government says the total stimulus -- which also calls for higher investment by state companies -- will be worth 4 trillion yuan ($586 billion) over the next two years.

China's economic growth fell to 9 percent in the latest quarter after a stunning 11.9 percent expansion last year. Exporters say foreign customers are canceling orders, which has led to layoffs and factory closures.

Mu blamed the weakness on the global downturn. But data released Friday showed domestic investment -- a key force driving China's rapid expansion -- is also cooling as companies cut back or put off spending on real estate, factories and other assets.

Investment in assets grew by 27.2 percent in the first 10 months of this year over the same period of 2007, the National Bureau of Statistics reported. That was down from the 27.6 percent growth reported for the first nine months of the year. Such investment is estimated to account for one-third of China's economic growth.

"China's pace of economic growth will reflect the extent to which accelerated infrastructure spending will be able to offset a slowdown in the property and manufacturing sectors," said a report by Jing Ulrich, JP Morgan Chase & Co.'s chairwoman for China equities.

"Further fiscal and monetary easing may be called for as growth moderates," Ulrich said.




... continua ...

Could fiscal policy rescue the day and prevent a Chinese hard landing? The optimists argue yes by pointing out that fiscal deficits and public debt are low in China and that China has the resources to engineer a rapid fiscal stimulus in a short period of time. But the ability of China to implement a rapid and massive fiscal stimulus is limited for a variety of reasons.

First, as pointed out by recent research (Global Insight) the combined effects of natural disasters, social strife in the West, and the Olympics have created a large hole in the central government budget this fiscal year. The Ministry of Finance may have dipped into various stabilisation funds to avoid the appearance of running a large deficit. For regional and municipal governments, the decline in turnover in local property markets has reduced the flow of fees and taxes, causing them to delay ambitious industrial development plans in some cases.

Second, a hard landing in the economy and in investment would lead to a sharp increase in non-performing loans of the – still mostly public – state banks; the implicit liabilities from a serious banking problem would then add to the implicit and explicit budget deficits and public debt. Note that the poor quality of the underwriting by Chinese banks –that financed a huge overinvestment in the economy - has been hidden for the last few years by the high growth of the economy. Once net exports go bust and real investment sharply falls we will see a massive surge in non-performing loans that financed low return and marginal investment projects. The ensuing fiscal costs of cleaning up the banking system could be really high.

Third, as pointed out by Michael Pettis – a leading expert of the Chinese economy – a surge in tax revenues in last 4 years has been more than matched by surge in spending so that if revenue growth diminishes/reverses it might not be easy to slow spending growth proportionately. Contingent liabilities from non-performing loans could also reduce resources available for a fiscal stimulus. As argued by Pettis: Total direct and indirect debt (and I am not including long term obligations like unfunded pension liabilities) is probably much higher than the official numbers which, depending on how you count, range from 15% to 30% of GDP…However, for reasons I have discussed many times before on this blog, I think actual Chinese government debt exceeds the visible debt. My guess is that without counting the possibility of rising NPLs in case of an economic slowdown (which ultimately can become contingent liabilities of the government), total government debt in China is probably 50% of GDP or higher. That means that China has a lot less room for running large fiscal deficits than we might suppose, and during the time it most needs to run a deficit – when the economy is slowing sharply – we may anyway see a surge in contingent debt as bank NPLs surge.

Fourth, while a fiscal policy stimulus has already started its scope and size has been so far relatively modest. Major stimulus measures announced by the Chinese government have included a major export tax rebate hike and a new state infrastructure plan and agreement to increase grain purchases to prop up export and investment growth. Further spending may include tax reform (value added tax to support fixed investment), more infrastructure spending, and on social security as well as government activities to provide capital to small and medium sized enterprises which can't access credit yet. The big question is however whether the Chinese government could increase the fiscal stimulus by an order of magnitude larger than the current effort if a quick order hard landing were to occur. The answer is probably not as moving a massive amount of economic resources from the tradeable sector to the non-tradeable sector (infrastructures and government spending on goods and services) will take time and cannot be done in a short period of time: the Chinese government has massive infrastructure projects for the next 5-10 years; but front-loading most of that multi-year spending over the next 12 to 18 months (if a hard landing risks to occur) will be close to mission impossible.

In conclusion the risk of a hard landing in China is sharply rising; a deceleration in the Chinese growth rate to 7% in 2009 - just a notch above a 6% hard landing – is highly likely and an even worse outcome cannot be ruled out at this point. The global economy is already headed towards a global recession as advanced economies are all in a recession and the U.S. contraction is now dramatically accelerating. The first engine of global growth – the U.S. on the consumption side – has now already shut down. The second engine of global growth – China on the production side – is also on its way to stalling. Thus, with the two main engines of global growth now in serious trouble a global hard landing is now almost a certainty. And a hard landing in China will have severe effects on growth in emerging market economies in Asia, Africa and Latin America as Chinese demand for raw materials and intermediate inputs has been a major source of economic growth for emerging markets and commodity exporters. The sharp recent fall in commodity prices and the near collapse of the Baltic Freight index are clear signals that Chinese and global demand for commodities and industrial inputs is sharply falling. Thus, global growth – at market prices – will be close to zero in Q3 of 2008, likely negative in Q4 of 2009 and well into negative territory in 2009. So brace yourself for an ugly and protracted global economic contraction in 2009.
 

ffrhmd

Member
El consumo USA por los suelos...

Fuente.- Roubini

U.S. has entered its most severe consumer-led recession in decades. At this rate of free fall in consumption real GDP growth could be a whopping 5% negative or even worse in Q4 of 2008. And this is not a temporary phenomenon as almost all of the fundamentals driving consumption are heading south on a persistent and structural basis. Consider the many severe negative factors affecting consumption. One can count at least 20 separate or complementary causes that will sharply reduce consumption in the next several years:


  1. The US consumer is shopped-out having spent for the last few years well above its means.
  2. The US consumer is saving-less as the already low household savings rate at the beginning of this decade went to zero/negative by 2006 and has now to raise to more sustainable levels.
  3. The US consumer is debt burdened with the debt to disposable income having increased from 70% in the early 1990s to 100% in 2000 and to 140% in 2008.
  4. Not only debt ratios are high and rising but debt servicing ratios are also high and rising having gone from 11% in 2000 to almost 15% now as the interest rate on mortgages and consumer debt is resetting at higher levels.
  5. The value of housing wealth is now sharply falling by over $6 trillion as home price depreciation will soon be 30% and reach a cumulative fall of over 40% by 2010. Recent estimates of this wealth effect suggest that the effect may be closer to 12-14% rather than the historical 5-7%. And with home prices falling over 30% about 40% of all households with a mortgage (or 21 million out of 50 who have a mortgage) will be under water (negative equity in their homes) with a huge incentive to walk away from their homes.
  6. Mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW) is collapsing from $700 billion annualized in 2005 to less than $20 in Q2 of this year. Thus, with falling housing wealth and collapsing MEH US households cannot use their homes anymore as ATM machines borrowing against them.
  7. The value of the equity wealth of US households has fallen by almost 50%, another ugly wealth effect on consumption.
  8. The credit crunch is becoming more severe as the recent Q2 flow of funds data and the Fed Loan Officers’ Survey suggests: it is spreading from sub-prime to near prime to prime mortgages and home equity loans; and from mortgages to credit cards, auto loans and student loans. Both the price and the quantity of credit are sharply tightening.
  9. Consumer confidence is down to levels not seen since the 1973-75 and 1980-82 recessions.
  10. Real wage growth and real income growth has been stagnant in the last few years as income and wealth inequality has been rising. And now with GDP and real incomes falling real consumption will fall sharply.
  11. The Fed is reaching the zero-bound on interest rates as the economy gets close to deflation given the slack in goods, labor and commodity markets. Deflation means that consumers will postpone consumption as future prices are lower than current prices, as real rates are positive and rising and as debt deflation increases the real value of the households nominal debts
  12. Employment has been falling for 10 months in a row and the rate of job losses is now accelerating. In the last recession in 2001 that was short and shallow (8 months from March to November 2001 with a cumulative fall in GDP of only 0.4%) job losses continued all the way until August 2003 with a job loss recovery and a total cumulative loss of jobs of over 5 million from the peak. In this cycle job losses have been so far “only” slightly over 1 million while labor market conditions are severely worsening based on all forward looking indicators such as initial and continuing claims for unemployment benefits. Massive job losses and concerns about job losses will further dampen current and expected income and further contract consumption.
  13. Tax rebates of over $100 billion failed to stimulate real consumption earlier in 2008. Only 25% of the tax rebate was spent as US consumers are worried about jobs and need to use funds to pay their credit card and mortgage. The tax rebate was supposed to boost consumption all the way through September 2008: in reality real retail sales and real personal spending rose only in April and May while starting in June and all the way in July, August, September, October and now into the holiday season real retail spending and real personal spending are down month after month. Thus, another general tax rebate would be as ineffective as the first one in boosting consumption.
  14. The 1990-91 and 2001 recessions were not global; this time around the IMF is forecasting a global recession for 2009.
  15. The recent rise in inflation – that is only now slowing down – reduced real incomes even further for lower income households who spend more than the average households on gas, transportation, energy and food. The recent sharp fall in gasoline and energy prices will increase real incomes by a modest amount (about $150 billion) but the losses of real disposable income and thus falling consumption from other sources (wealth, income, debt servicing ratios) are much larger and more significant.
  16. The trade weighted fall in the value of the U.S. dollar since 2002 has worsened the terms of trade of the US and reduced further real disposable income and the purchasing power of US consumers over foreign goods.
  17. With consumption being over 71% of GDP a sharp and persistent contraction of consumption all the way through at least Q4 of 2009 implies a more severe recession than otherwise. Consumption did not fall even a single quarter in the 2001 recession and one has to go back to 1990-91 to see a single quarter of negative consumption growth. But the worsening balance sheet of US consumers in 1990-91 (debt ratios, debt servicing ratios, employment contraction, wealth effects of housing and stock markets) was much less severe than the current downturn.
  18. Monetary easing will not stimulate durable consumption and demand for residential housing as demand for such capital goods becomes interest rate insensitive when there is a glut of capital goods; monetary policy becomes like pushing on a string. In the previous recession the Fed cut the Fed Funds rate from 6.5% to 1% and long rates fell by 200bps. In spite of that capex spending of the corporate sector fell by 4% of GDP between 2000 and 2004 as there was a glut of tech capital goods and it took years to work out such a glut. Today there is a glut of housing, consumer durables and autos/motor vehicles; so it will take years to work out this glut and monetary policy is becoming ineffective to resolve that glut.
  19. While policy rates are sharply falling the nominal and real rates faced by households are rising rather than falling: rising mortgage rates (and event near lack of any mortgage financing at even higher rates for sub-prime and jumbo loans), rising rates on credit cards, auto loans and student loans together with less availability of credit are severely dampening the ability of households to borrow and spend.
  20. To bring back the household savings rate to the level of a decade ago (about 6% of GDP) consumption will have to fall – relative to current GDP levels – by almost a trillion dollar. If all of this adjustment were to occur in 12 months GDP would contract directly by 7% and indirectly (including the further collapse of residential and corporate capex spending in a severe recession) by 10%, an exemplification of the Keynesian “paradox of thrift”. If such an adjustment were to occur over 24 months rather than 12 months you would still have negative GDP growth of 5% for two years in a row with a cumulative fall in GDP from its peak of 10% (note that in the worst US recession since WWII such cumulative fall in GDP was only 3.7% in 1957-58). One can thus only hope that this adjustment of consumption and savings rates occurs only slowly over time – four years rather than two. Even in that scenario the cumulative fall of GDP could be of the order of 4-5%, i.e. the worst US recession since WWII. Note that the cumulative fall in GDP in the 2001 recession was only 0.4% and in the 1990-9 recession was only 1.3%. So, the current recession may end up being three times as long and at least three times as deep (in terms of output contraction) than the last two and worse than any other post WWII recession.
 
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POKEMON

Member
Sois como tener a la family en casa. Gracias a todos por la respuesta pq la verdad es que estaba en un lio mental que ya ha quedado despejado.
Gracias miles a Fito por tu borrador, a guancheaborígen (que siempre se acuerda de contestarme) a Patxi, a Darkpollo (perdona que te confundí con Jorgemac).
Besos a todos y este es un foro mmmmmmmmaravilloso.
 

juanito

Well-Known Member
el viernes dia 7 firmé la HMD,entré en euros,y sistema de amortizacion aleman.en este producto que sistema de amortizacion es mas usual,el frances o el aleman?
 

trocito

Banned
¿a cuánto cerró el yen el viernes?

en xe.com está ahora en 122.960
 

fito

Member
Sois como tener a la family en casa. Gracias a todos por la respuesta pq la verdad es que estaba en un lio mental que ya ha quedado despejado.
Gracias miles a Fito por tu borrador, a guancheaborígen (que siempre se acuerda de contestarme) a Patxi, a Darkpollo (perdona que te confundí con Jorgemac).
Besos a todos y este es un foro mmmmmmmmaravilloso.
pero al menos lo tienes claro?:confused:
es que me parecía que estabas mas liao que la pata de un romano.:D
Por cierto es contando a 25 años
Y más o menos la cuota en € sería de rondando los 2000 lereles, no?
Sin cabreo, pero deberíamos ir al otro hilo, si no te queda claro, lo deberíamos seguir en otro.:)

saludos
:cool:
 
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minuma

Member
No hay minusvalia

una preguntilla para los economistas, si debemos más deuda virtual, pero que si queremos cancelar, o nos ejecutan la clausulilla, o lo que sea, vemos que no es virtual, que legalmente es lo que realmente debemos, bueno busco algo de positivo al tema: ¿cómo se declaran a hacienda cómo minusvalías?

buenas tardes, ten en cuanta que lo que el banco hace, quiero pensar que es así, es pedirque que amortices capital por lo que lo unico que te podrás desgravar en la mencionada amortización.
 
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